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I. Introduction 
Consider Ethel Baxter, an elderly woman who has never 
missed so much as a car payment in her decades of credit history. 
Her claims record is essentially spotless—a dream policyholder for 
insurers. She lives in northern California, owns her own home, and 
has regular income from social security and a part-time job. Now 
imagine the conversation when her insurance provider tells Ethel 
that she is no longer eligible for property insurance because her 
home is located near wild brush that represents a fire hazard. 
Ethel has never heard of the brush impacting her policy before, nor 
did she have any meeting or conversation with a claims adjuster 
about it at any point. How could this have happened to such an 
outstanding policyholder like herself? Why didn’t she have an 
opportunity to be heard, or at least understand the process? How 
did the insurance company decide her property was suddenly too 
high of a risk? 
What if the decision wasn’t even made by a real person? 
Ethel’s insurer has just received an exemption to fly drones over 
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insured properties for “risk assessment” and property surveillance. 
What if Ethel was evaluated by something without the ability to 
see beyond still-shots, numbers, and analytical formulas; 
something programmed to analyze and predict the future of her 
property without so much as a blink in her direction?  
This is the danger that people like Ethel face with the rise of 
commercial insurance drones in risk assessment and claims 
adjustment.1 Insurance companies are at the forefront of a 
movement by commercial entities to take advantage of evolving 
drone technology.2 These insurers envision a world where drones 
will replace human agents in field operations across the industry, 
gathering, analyzing, and sharing data with a ruthless efficiency 
that the public has never seen.3 In this world, human agents will 
be necessary only to rubber-stamp the recommendations of a 
drone’s analysis of a property.4 Proponents of drone integration 
laud their potential to offer crucial assistance in claims and 
assessment situations where a human agent would encounter 
danger and difficulty.5 Lost in the revelry, however, is an equally 
dangerous issue: will these drones increase the likelihood of 
unfairly discriminatory insurance practices, and can that effect be 
stopped? 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Donan, infra note 106 (“UAVs eventually will enjoy widespread 
adoption throughout [the insurance] industry, and one day in the foreseeable 
future they will be commonplace.”). 
 2. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (giving an estimate of 
operational commercial drones expected by 2020, and discussing the role of 
insurance companies in the integration process). 
 3. See Keven Moore, Drones May Be Coming To a Fender-Bender or a Storm 
Near You, KYFORWARD (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.kyforward.com/keven-moore-
on-insurance-drones-may-be-coming-to-a-fender-bender-or-storm-near-you/ (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“In the future, underwriters can send out drones to assess 
square footage of the building, the condition of a building’s exterior as they can 
provide great views of roofing, siding, windows, perimeter fencing, lighting 
exterior hazards, neighboring exposures in great detail.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See id. (describing the various uses for insurance drones in claims 
adjustment and underwriting, and envisioning a system where insurance agents 
rely on the data drones gather to process a claim off-site). 
 5. See id. (praising the versatility of drones and their potential to replace 
insurance agents in common, hazardous situations presented by the industry, 
such as roof damage assessment, fire and disaster assessment, and catastrophe 
surveys). 
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This potential for unfairly discriminatory insurance practices 
also implicates constitutional issues—namely, a potential clash 
with the Disparate Impact Rule.6 The concept of disparate impact 
reflects the federal government’s concern for the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and facially discriminatory 
practices.7 The operation of the Rule legitimizes an Equal 
Protection claim for “protected classes” who experience a 
discriminatory impact from an insurance practice that is 
technically legal.8 Although its application has been met with some 
resistance, Congress has specifically recognized the Rule’s 
importance in prohibiting discriminatory insurance practices in 
the housing market.9 The integration of risk assessment drones, 
however, threatens to reanimate these issues with a vengeance.10 
If insurers’ usage of drones is not appropriately regulated, the 
potential for conceptually legal insurance practices with disparate, 
discriminatory consequences becomes an unchecked reality.11 
What do we tell Ethel as she fights for a fair insurance rating 
against an enemy who doesn’t talk back? How will we assure those 
who land in a risk assessment drone’s sights that they are being 
fairly evaluated, and that the data these drones are collecting is 
being properly used and protected? Can we even promise those 
protections? The reality of what the public faces here is 
                                                                                                     
 6. Discriminatory Effect Prohibited, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2015). 
 7. See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text (outlining the concept of 
disparate impact and its development through Supreme Court jurisprudence as 
a response to Equal Protection concerns in discrimination claims). 
 8. See § 100.500 (“Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act 
based on a practice's discriminatory effect . . . even if the practice was not 
motivated by a discriminatory intent.”). 
 9. See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (discussing the 
codification, statutory structure, and requirements of the modern version of the 
Disparate Impact Rule as applied in concert with the Fair Housing Act). 
 10. See Tom Karol, Unmanned Aerial Systems/Drones—Regulation, 
Liability, and Insurance Requirements, NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES 6–7 
(2015), http://www.namic.org/pdf/15memberadvisory/150226_drones.pdf (listing 
insurers’ intended uses for commercial drones in the risk assessment and claims 
adjustment fields, discussing potential liabilities from data collection and 
scanning, and large-scale impacts on subjects of drone operations). 
 11. See id. at 14 (warning of the “lack of regulatory specification” with regard 
to insurers’ evolving usage of commercial drones, and suggesting that insurers 
themselves must “play a role in developing standards of good practice” for such 
drone operations if they are to avoid liability and damaging impacts to the public).  
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inescapable. Discriminatory insurance practices like redlining 
have once again become tangible threats because of this robotic 
and impersonal risk assessment and claims adjustment process.12 
If the regulatory landscape does not adapt to these new dangers 
with deliberate speed, any hope for a clear, consistent, or even 
adequate response to this threat is left in shambles.13 
Part II of this Note outlines the development of both unfair 
discrimination and disparate impact jurisprudence within the 
insurance industry and where it stands today.14 Part III offers a 
primer on the integration of commercial drones into the insurance 
industry and their capabilities, followed by a brief introduction to 
the current regulatory landscape surrounding commercial drone 
usage.15 Subsequently, Part IV discusses the nexus between risk 
assessment and claims adjustment drones and a potential rise in 
discriminatory insurance practices.16 Finally, Part V exposes the 
inadequacies of current regulatory efforts towards these drones 
and discusses how best to identify and respond to potential 
discriminatory practices.17 Part V also proposes targeted solutions 
for identified risks in the form of a cohesive regulatory scheme, and 
ultimately explores which entities, if any, could best implement 
such a proposal.18 
                                                                                                     
 12. See infra notes 130–140 and accompanying text (examining modern 
insurance tactics that utilize evolving technology to revive discriminatory 
redlining and other discriminatory insurance practices). 
 13. See Karol, supra note 10, at 14 (“There will always be risks in the 
commercial use of drones, and property/ casualty insurance will be a critical 
consideration . . . but responsible insurance coverage for this emerging area will 
require more development of federal, state, and local regulations . . . .”). 
 14. Infra Part II. 
 15. Infra Part III. 
 16. Infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part V.A–B (discussing the inadequacies of present commercial 
drone regulations and proposing a methodology for identifying potential risks and 
developing regulatory countermeasures to respond to them). 
 18. See infra Part V.C (proposing targeted regulatory countermeasures to 
combat unfairly discriminatory insurance practices resulting from commercial 
drone integration, and exploring suitable entities for implementation of those 
solutions). 
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II. Development of Current Unfair Discrimination and Disparate 
Impact Jurisprudence  
A. Unfairly Discriminatory Insurance Practices 
Understanding unfairly discriminatory insurance practices 
and the development of the law behind them is critical in 
exploring the correlation between these practices and risk 
assessment drones. Assessing and rating the risks inherent to a 
potential subject of insurance is a central element of an insurer’s 
formula.19 Consequently, the need for guidance on the 
appropriate methods for this assessment cannot be 
understated.20  
“The standard rating law holds that rates shall not be 
‘excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.’”21 “Unfair 
discrimination, as the term is employed by the Insurance Code, 
means discrimination among insureds of the same class based 
upon something other than actuarial risk.”22 Facially, the law 
seems to provide a relatively straightforward starting point for 
evaluating discriminatory insurance practices.23 Practically, this 
is merely a cliff from which most analyses plunge into chaos. In 
particular, two aspects of this mystifying jurisprudence are of 
interest to this Note: the multitude of subjective tests that courts 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Anti-
Discrimination Laws 1 (Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 52, 2013), 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=law_e
con_current (“Insurers attempt to segregate insureds into separate risk pools 
based on their differences in risk profiles, first, so that they can charge different 
premiums to the different groups based on their risk and, second, to incentivize 
risk reduction by insureds.”). 
 20. See id. at 2 (stating that, despite the “valuable social function” that 
insurers can provide through discrimination, there are “limits on the 
discrimination that insurers are permitted to engage in”). 
 21. 2 NATHANIEL S. SHAPO, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY 
EDITION § 11.03(1)(a) (2013). For examples of statutes that reflect the “excessive, 
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory” standard, see generally COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 10-4-401(1) (2015); D.C. CODE § 31-2703(A) (2015). 
 22. SHAPO, supra note 21 § 11.03. 
 23. See id. (“The laws pertaining to risk discrimination are evaluated under 
terms of art: fair discrimination and unfair discrimination. It is well established 
that the dividing line is determined by actuarial justification.”). 
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use for determining whether discrimination is “unfair”24 and the 
rise—and possible fall—of the Disparate Impact Rule.25 
Some discrimination in insurance practices is acceptable—if 
not unavoidable—due to the nature of weighing risk against 
coverage, but there must be a limit.26 State courts have struggled, 
however, with various subjective patterns of analysis for 
determining whether a particular insurance practice is “unfairly” 
discriminatory.27 State statutes are often the primary guidance for 
courts in this evaluation, yet this guidance has led to even greater 
inconsistency.28 
In Hartford Accounting and Indemnification Co. v. Insurance 
Commissioner of the Commonwealth,29 the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that it was within its power to enforce the state 
legislature’s prohibition on “unfairly discriminatory” insurance 
ratings.30 Yet, the court acknowledged that the relevant statute 
did not define the phrase and, thus, took the responsibility of 
defining it in the context of the facts before it.31 Ultimately, the 
court rejected a narrow, technical interpretation of “fairness”32 and 
                                                                                                     
 24. See infra notes 27–43 and accompanying text (comparing subjective state 
court analyses of “fairness” and describing the inconsistencies in state anti-
discrimination law). 
 25. See infra notes 45–63 and accompanying text (detailing the genesis, 
evolution, and application of the Disparate Impact Rule). 
 26. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 2 (“Insurers attempt to classify insureds 
into separate risk pools based on differences in their risk profiles. Thus, insurers 
openly discriminate among individuals based on observable characteristics.”). 
 27. See id. at 1 (offering an overview of the Article’s discussion, including the 
lack of federal regulation and the reliance on various state schemes for evaluating 
discriminatory practices in the insurance field).  
 28. See id. at 3 (“[D]iscrimination by insurers in the underwriting process is 
largely unregulated at the federal level, leaving the states as the regulators of 
insurer discrimination.”). 
 29. 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984). 
 30. See id. at 546 (“[T]he legislature has directly prohibited insurers from 
making ‘unfairly discriminatory’ rates, and has entrusted enforcement of that 
prohibition . . . to the courts.”). 
 31. See id. (“The basic issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of the 
phrase ‘unfairly discriminatory’ as employed in section 3(d) of the Rate Act, 40 
P.S. § 1183(d) (1971). That phrase is not defined in the Rate Act itself.”). 
 32. See id. at 547 (“[S]ection 3(d) manifests separate legislative objectives 
which represent the recognition that a rate may be justified by the actuarial data 
offered in its support, yet unfair in its underlying assumptions and its application 
to the individual.”). 
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instead held that fairness represented a legislative concept beyond 
what was required for a mere actuarial justification.33 This 
prompted “public policy considerations,” including an examination 
of legislative intent behind provisions of Pennsylvania’s 
constitution and consideration of subjective factors such as “social 
acceptability.”34 Ultimately, the court stopped short of ruling solely 
on public policy. Instead, the court linked a broader definition of 
“unfair discrimination” to the state’s constitution.35 Despite the 
court’s ruling, however, it cannot be denied that subjective factors 
colored the Hartford court’s interpretation of the relevant 
statutory direction through the consideration of the state’s 
“established public policy.”36  
Compare the Hartford ruling to the Oregon Court of Appeals 
decision in Lemma Wine Co. v. National Council on Compensation 
Insurance.37 In Lemma, the court took a narrower route to 
determine the meaning of “unfairly discriminatory” thanks to 
Oregon’s more specific statutory language.38 Where the 
                                                                                                     
 33. See id. (“[T]he ‘fairness’ of rates must be recognized as a legislative 
concern distinct from and transcending the need for sound actuarial 
justification.”). 
 34. See id. at 547–49 (discussing various public policies relating to equal 
protection and discrimination, holding that public policy considerations “require 
more adequate justification for rating factors than simple statistical correlation 
with loss,” and recommending the consideration of criteria such as causality, 
reliability, and social acceptability in judging the “reasonableness of a 
classification system”). 
 35. The court read gender-based discrimination as “unfair” based on its 
interpretation of the state legislature’s intent in drafting the document. See id. at 
549 (ruling that, while the court did not affirmatively recognize the power of the 
state commissioner to “implement the public policy of [Pennsylvania] in the 
absence of legislative direction,” considerations of the legislature’s intent and 
relevant social and political factors necessitated a broad definition of “unfair” 
discrimination). 
 36. See id. at 549 (upholding the Commissioner’s ruling that the rating 
classification’s sex-based discrimination was “contrary to established public 
policy” and was an appropriate exercise of his power in determining the fairness 
of a discriminatory insurance practice). 
 37. See 95 P.3d 238, 240 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (evaluating an allegedly unfair 
discrimination in rating assessment in the application of a worker’s compensation 
ratings exception to various employees, and stating that the question presented 
was “whether some of employer's workers should be subject to a standard 
exception”). 
 38. See id. at 243 (citing OAR 836–042–0025(3), which provides that 
“[p]remiums are unfairly discriminatory if differentials between insureds fail to 
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Pennsylvania court refuted a technical definition of fairness, the 
Lemma court embraced it, focusing on statistical differentials and 
whether they were reasonably reflected in ratings.39 Even so, the 
Oregon statute’s reliance on a “reasonable reflection” standard still 
leaves courts holding the bag by placing yet another subjective 
evaluation on their shoulders.40  
The Hartford and Lemma holdings are just two examples of 
the inherent difficulties states face in evaluating “unfair 
discrimination.” States are forced to accept this burden in large 
part due to the dearth of applicable federal laws.41 This in turn has 
led to the large and inconsistent existing pool of state risk 
classification laws.42 For example, eighteen states currently have 
no restrictions against the consideration of race in property and 
casualty insurance risk classification.43 The inconsistency in these 
statutes with regard to both the characteristics they consider and 
the jurisdictions in which they reside set a dangerous stage for the 
courts that rely on them.44  
                                                                                                     
reasonably reflect the differences in expected losses and expenses to the insurer 
attributable to the insureds” (emphasis added)). 
 39. See id. (describing OAR 836–042–0025(3)’s exceptions to an unfair 
discrimination classification where statistical differences used in the rating 
scheme can be “attributed to the insureds” and those differences are “reasonably 
reflected” by the rating plan or system at issue). 
 40. See id. (balancing the ultimate decision of whether to apply a statutory 
exception on whether or not “reasonableness” could be shown and failing to define 
“reasonableness” in the context of the statute). 
 41. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 3 (discussing that, outside of four recent 
federal statutes, “there are no federal laws expressly forbidding insurers from 
engaging in any form of discrimination in the underwriting process”). 
 42. See id. at 4–5 (discussing the “conventional wisdom” among insurance 
scholars (scholars encompasses teachers) in describing characteristics which were 
assumed to be prohibited from consideration in risk classification by all states, 
and discrediting those assumptions through contrary statistical evidence). 
 43. See id. at 5 (listing the number of states that do not restrict the 
consideration of race as a risk classification factor for different insurance sectors 
such as health, life, automobile, and property insurance). “As all this suggests, 
affirmative bans of insurer discrimination on the basis of potentially suspect 
policyholder traits are quite rare.” Id.  
 44. See id. at 46 (“[T]he precise rules that govern the line between 
permissible and impermissible discrimination [have] been almost entirely 
ignored, in large part because of the complexity and opacity of state law on the 
topic.”). 
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B. The Disparate Impact Rule  
One of the rare federal regimes to address discriminatory 
insurance practices specifically is the Disparate Impact Rule (the 
Rule).45 The Rule represents the federal government’s desire to 
create a consistent standard for applying the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA) to discrimination claims brought against facially neutral 
practices.46 It allows a plaintiff struggling or unable to prove the 
existence of discriminatory intent to earn a favorable judgment 
nonetheless.47  
The Rule’s conception traces back to seminal Supreme Court 
equal protection decisions, including Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.48 and Washington v. 
Davis.49 In both cases, the Court eventually rejected the Rule (then 
referred to as “disproportionate impact”) as standalone grounds to 
prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.50 The Court laid the groundwork for the Rule’s evolution, 
however, in its discussion of claims under Title VII of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981,51 arguing that the consideration of such an impact, 
                                                                                                     
 45. See Michael J. Miller, Disparate Impact and Unfairly Discriminatory 
Insurance Rates, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y E-FORUM 276, 281 (2009), 
http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/09wforum/miller.pdf (summarizing courts’ 
definitions of disparate impact discrimination and subjective methods of analysis 
used to define what disparate impact practices may be considered fairly or 
unfairly discriminatory). 
 46. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11, 460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (“This rule serves the need 
described above by establishing a consistent standard for assessing claims that a 
facially neutral practice violates the Fair Housing Act and by incorporating that 
standard in HUD’s existing Fair Housing Act regulations at 24 CFR 100.500.”). 
 47. See Discriminatory Effect Prohibited, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2015) 
(“Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice's 
discriminatory effect, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, even if the 
practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent.”). 
 48. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 49. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 50. See Village, 429 U.S. at 264–65 (“[O]fficial action will not be held 
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.”); 
Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–39 (asserting that the Court has never held the 
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of racial discrimination to be 
focused solely on a “racially differential impact” and declining to do so in the case 
at issue). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
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although not controlling, was “not irrelevant.”52 This treatment of 
disproportionate impact, despite the outcomes of Village and 
Davis, legitimized the concept as a potential tool in discrimination-
based claims. 
In 2013, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) issued a notice of final rulemaking allowing 
the Rule’s application to insurance practices through the FHA.53 
The Code of Federal Regulations54 defines discriminatory effects 
sufficient to trigger the Rule,55 describes the burdens required for 
its application,56 and offers defendants a chance to preempt its 
application through justification.57  
The basic purpose of the Rule’s application to insurance is to 
prohibit insurance practices related to housing that “have an 
unjustified disparate impact on protected classes.”58 For example, 
in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cisneros,59 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a practical application of 
the Rule to a disfavored insurance practice known as “redlining.”60 
                                                                                                     
 52. See Village, 429 U.S. at 265 (citing Davis in a discussion of 
disproportionate impact as “not irrelevant” but also not controlling in a finding of 
invidious racial discrimination); Davis, 426 U.S. at 242, 246–47 (holding that 
“disproportionate impact is not irrelevant [to find invidious racial 
discrimination],” and discussing Title VII’s more stringent standard for 
“validation” of challenged practices with racially disproportionate impacts while 
conceding the benefits of its application in certain situations outside of the 
holding at issue). 
 53. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,460 (showing the notice of final rulemaking that 
described the discriminatory effects provision’s enactment through the FHA and 
applying it to insurance practices). 
 54. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2015). 
 55. See id. (including predictable disparate impacts and patterns of 
segregated housing based on “race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, 
or national origin”). 
 56. See id. (requiring a plaintiff to establish that the challenged practice has 
caused or will predictably cause a discriminatory effect as defined in the section). 
 57. See id. (offering defendants a chance to rebut a claimant’s challenge by 
proving that the challenged practice is “necessary to achieve one or more 
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests” of the defendant). 
 58. Avraham, supra note 19, at 3. 
 59. 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 60. See id. at 1354–59 (holding that the government supports HUD’s 
interpretation of the FHA, which includes a prohibition against “redlining,” and 
considering it an unfairly discriminatory practice). 
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The Cisneros court defined “redlining” as any situation where “the 
insurer charges higher rates or declines to write insurance for 
people who live in particular areas.”61 A two-to-one decision 
granted deference to the state’s interpretation of the Rule and 
deemed redlining an unfairly discriminatory practice under the 
FHA’s construction in the context of property and hazard 
insurance.62 Other courts have similarly applied the Rule to racial 
and economic discrimination scenarios involving risk 
assessment.63 
Such applications of the Rule, however, came under recent 
scrutiny by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 
American Insurance Association v. United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development.64 The court found that the 
FHA’s prohibition is clearly limited to cases of “intentional” 
discrimination.65 Consequently, the FHA preempts any disparate 
impact claims because they necessarily involve a lack of 
discriminatory intent.66 Still, other courts have declined to follow 
the American Insurance court’s reasoning and continue to consider 
the Rule as a legitimate means of finding an insurance practice 
unfairly discriminatory in certain contexts.67  
Amidst this disagreement, the Rule won a critical victory in 
the Supreme Court. In Texas Department of Housing & 
                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 1359. 
 62. See id. (“[W]e conclude that HUD’s interpretation of the Fair Housing 
Act is reasonable in light of the direct connection of availability of property 
insurance and ability to purchase a house.”). 
 63. See Miller, supra note 45, at 282 (describing various courts’ application 
of the disparate impact discrimination concept to insurance practices, including 
racial and economic discrimination scenarios as compared to “risk 
discrimination”). 
 64. See 74 F. Supp. 3d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing the operation of the 
disparate impact rule and the “clear language” jurisprudence surrounding its 
application to claims of discriminatory intent or effect). 
 65. See id. at 39 (“For the following reasons, I agree with the plaintiffs that 
the FHA unambiguously prohibits only intentional discrimination.”). 
 66. See id. (holding that because the FHA “unambiguously prohibits only 
intentional discrimination” the Disparate Impact Rule is outside the scope of the 
APA for this matter). 
 67. See Viens v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 113 F. Supp. 3d 555, 572 
(D. Conn. 2015) (declining to follow American Insurance in holding that disparate 
impact claims were not preempted by the FHA and did not conflict with the 
McCann-Ferguson Act). 
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Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,68 the 
Supreme Court responded to the growing debate over the Rule’s 
role in the FHA. Inclusive Communities upheld the FHA’s 
application of the Rule to equal protection claims regarding 
housing discrimination.69 The Court praised the Rule’s ability to 
sniff out discriminatory intent70 and promote the objectives of the 
FHA.71 Furthermore, the Court stressed that the limitations and 
built-in safeguards within the Rule would prevent it from being 
heavily abused.72 Among other industries, insurers were 
disappointed at the result of Inclusive Communities, as it 
represents yet another volley in the increasingly unpredictable 
enforcement of the Rule.73 
Given the inherent subjectivity of judicial evaluations of 
“fairness,”74 the incongruent landscape of relevant state laws,75 
                                                                                                     
 68. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).  
 69. See id. at 2525 (“The Court holds that disparate-impact claims are 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented 
language, the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the 
ADEA, Congress’ ratification of disparate-impact claims in 1988 . . . and the 
statutory purpose.”). 
 70. See id. at 2522 (“[The Rule] permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious 
prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate 
treatment.”). 
 71. See id. (“The availability of disparate-impact liability, furthermore, has 
allowed private developers to vindicate the FHA’s objectives and to protect their 
property rights by stopping municipalities from enforcing arbitrary and, in 
practice, discriminatory ordinances barring the construction of certain types 
of housing units.”). 
 72. See id. at 2522–25 (explaining the requirements for a claim to be brought 
under the Rule for the purposes of the FHA and the guaranteed opportunity for a 
defendant to explain a challenged practice, and offering some guidance for lower 
courts in interpreting whether the claim meets the necessary statutory elements). 
 73. See Greg Stohr, Insurers Disappointed as Supreme Court Backs 
Disparate Impact Claims, INS. J. (June 25, 2015), http://www. 
insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/06/25/373004.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2016) (detailing the responses of several major insurance lobbyist groups to the 
Inclusive Communities holding, including the promise of the National Association 
of Mutual Insurance Companies to “continue to fight [HUD’s] attempt to impose 
[the Rule] without justification on the homeowners’ insurance marketplace”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74. See supra notes 28–40 and accompanying text (discussing the subjective 
analyses courts use in determining fairness in discriminatory practices). 
 75. See supra notes 41–44 (discussing the reliance of courts on state anti-
discrimination laws, and the substantive differences and lack of predictability 
with which they are constructed). 
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and the precarious state of disparate impact jurisprudence,76 
insured parties may encounter increasing difficulty in challenging 
insurance practices as unfair where clear discriminatory intent 
cannot be shown. This trend poses an even graver threat to insured 
parties when coupled with insurers’ unchecked implementation of 
commercial risk assessment drones, whose capabilities represent 
the next generation of potentially unfair discriminatory practices. 
III. Risk Assessment Drones: Introduction, Capabilities, and 
Current Regulations  
A. Insurance Drones: Integration and Capabilities  
This Note now applies the above understanding of anti-
discrimination and disparate impact jurisprudence77 to the 
imminent rise of commercial risk assessment drones. By 2020, it is 
estimated that “30,000 commercial drones will occupy the national 
airspace.”78 Currently, four major insurance providers have 
received preliminary “test” exemptions allowing them to use 
commercial drones for business purposes such as risk assessment 
and claims adjustment.79 In total, eleven “insurance companies” 
have received such exemptions as of this writing.80 The insurers’ 
                                                                                                     
 76. See supra notes 64–74 and accompanying text (describing recent 
challenges to the FHA’s application of the Rule and contention over whether to 
apply it in enforcing discrimination violations found against facially neutral 
practices with discriminatory effects). 
 77. See supra Part II (outlining the current state of fairness evaluations, 
state anti-discrimination laws as applied to insurance practices, and disparate 
impact jurisprudence). 
 78. See The Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy 
Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 28 
(2013) (Statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) 
(estimating the figures for drone integration in the next few years, and discussing 
the government’s increasing role in preparing for that integration). 
 79. See Michael Thrasher, Insurance Companies Ready to Use Drones to 
Evaluate Claims, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 23, 2015, 6:00 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2015/04/23/insurance-companies-ready-to-use-drones-to-
evaluate-claims/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“[In addition to USAA,] State Farm, 
AIG, and Erie Insurance have also been granted exemptions allowing for the 
testing or use of drones commercially . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 80. See Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 Exemptions, FED. AVIATION 
ADMIN., 
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justifications for drone implementation include the desires to 
reduce the number of “feet on the ground” and streamline their 
claims processes.81 
It is important to examine the capabilities of these drones to 
understand the nexus between this technological revolution and 
the potential for increased discriminatory insurance practices. The 
latest risk assessment drones can collect images, video, and 
statistical data at high speeds while flying programmed routes.82 
Many of these drones can also transmit collected data directly to 
third parties such as defense attorneys and forensic engineers.83  
The immediate benefits of drone capabilities are concededly 
appealing, especially considering the scale of properties that 
insurers must often assess.84 Researchers laud the preciseness and 
versatility of the high-resolution cameras and laser scanners on 
board in creating 3D maps of surveyed areas.85 The potential for 
                                                                                                     
http://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/333_authorizations/ (last 
updated Sept. 20, 2016) (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (showing eleven total entries 
for exemptions granted to “insurance companies” as defined in the FAA’s 
database) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81. See Thrasher, supra note 79 (describing USAA’s desire to implement 
drones in claims assessment “so that there aren’t as many feet on the ground” and 
discussing potential data transfer and communication capabilities of drones that 
could streamline the flow of information). 
 82. See Agil Francis et al., Drones: The Insurance Industry’s Next Game-
Changer?, KEEP CHALLENGING 4 (2009), 
http://www.cognizant.com/InsightsWhitepapers/drones-the-insurance-
industry's-next-game-changer-codex1019.pdf (describing the capabilities of risk 
assessment drones’ on-board infrared cameras, high-resolution cameras, 
navigation, and data transmission capabilities and claiming that this technology 
forecloses the need for a human to conduct the investigation in person); see also 
Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to 
Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2014) (discussing 
camera optics, sensors, and other equipment on various models of commercial and 
military drones). 
 83. See White Paper Predicts Drones as Next Big Thing in Insurance, CLAIMS 
J., http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2014/10/23/256681.htm (last 
updated Oct. 23, 2014) (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Utilizing outside experts 
becomes easier since drones could transmit photos to defense attorneys, forensic 
engineers and inside claims staff.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 84. See id. (discussing the ability of risk assessment drone models to reach 
places, capture images, and scan large areas in ways that human agents cannot). 
 85. See MEASURE, INC., DRONES FOR DISASTER RESPONSE AND RELIEF 
OPERATIONS 30 (2015) (describing the capability of drones to use LiDAR lasers 
and high-definition cameras to map disaster areas, identify flooding patterns, and 
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instant upload and third-party data transmissions through 
software integration is also an emphasis point for drone 
proponents searching for more efficient insurance practices.86 
Additionally, drone payloads are extremely customizable, allowing 
insurers to outfit a model with anything and everything that might 
aid the drone’s mission.87 Some have even promoted the idea that 
insurance drone technology might revolutionize disaster relief and 
claims processing.88 It is easy to see why groups champion the 
introduction of this powerful technology into our airspace—it takes 
a more critical perspective, however, to realize the risks. 
B. Drone Regulations Today  
Current government regulations on the use of commercial 
drones are rudimentary at best, and their future remains vague. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was tasked with 
promulgating initial rules to govern the integration of commercial 
drones into the national airspace no later than September 30, 
2015.89 However, the FAA fell well behind the deadline initially set 
for their first set of rules,90 eating up months of valuable time 
                                                                                                     
assess insurance claims and risks). 
 86. See id. at 7 (discussing commercial drone software pairing that allows 
for things like data-sharing over a cloud-based network, crowd-sourced crisis 
mapping, and integration with GPS and satellite networks). 
 87. See id. (discussing how a drone’s payload affects the types of data it can 
collect, ranging from infrared and electro-optic sensors to communications relays 
that broadcast wireless frequencies as a mobile hotspot). 
 88. See id. at 4 (“Drones naturally complement traditional manned relief 
operations by helping to ensure that operations can be conducted safer, faster, 
and more efficiently.”). 
 89. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-381, at 64 (2012) (Conf. Rep.) (ordering the FAA 
to promulgate regulations for the integration of drones into the national airspace 
no later than September 30, 2015). See generally Federal Aviation Administration 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012) 
(offering a full text of the Act that mandates the FAA to provide for commercial 
drone integration). 
 90. See Dibya Sarkar, NTIA to Address Drone Privacy, Transparency, 
Accountability Early Next Month, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DAILY (July 21, 
2015), http://criticalinfrastructuredaily.com/ntia-to-address-drone-privacy-trans 
parency-accountability-early-next-month/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“The FAA is 
also working on a congressional mandate to safely integrate unmanned aircraft 
into the national airspace by September, but several officials have previously said 
that deadline will likely not be met.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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reviewing and addressing comments to its proposed regulations 
issued in February 2015.91 In the meantime, the FAA issued a 
special exemption application process for all “civil” (commercial) 
unmanned aircraft systems.92 A “Certificate of Authorization” 
(COA) is also required but is generally granted as a “blanket” 
certificate to most applicants.93 The temporary requirements were 
broad, cursory regulations aimed mostly at limiting the physical 
operation.94 Section 333 restrictions did not specifically evaluate 
the technological capabilities of exempted drones.95 Instead, they 
merely required an applicant to describe the basics of the proposed 
operation and how the exemption would benefit the public 
interest.96  
In a disappointing—and overdue—finale, the FAA announced 
its pending release of Final Rule 107 for small-scale drone 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 91. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 21) 
(issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking and asking for public comment on the 
integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace). 
 92. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
§ 333 (2012) (granting the exclusive authority for approval of interim usage of 
civil unmanned aircraft in the national airspace to the Secretary of the FAA, and 
mandating the creation of “safe operation” requirements for each unmanned 
system to receive an exception). 
 93. See Petitioning for Exemption Under Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition/ 
(last updated Sept. 20, 2016, 8:09 PM) (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (explaining that 
COA applications are separate from Section 333 applications, but that a “blanket” 
COA will be issued to any unmanned air system with a Section 333 exception that 
is under fifty-five pounds, flies under 200 feet, and is operated during the daytime 
within visual line of sight of the operator) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 94. See id. (creating effectively applicable minimum safety regulations to 
every Section 333 exemption, which are entirely aimed at controlling visual line 
of sight, spacing and maximum altitude of flight, and size of the drone, without 
regard to technical capability).  
 95. See Section 333 Petition Guidance and Checklist, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition/m
edia/How_to_Send_Your_Petition_for_Exemption_or_Rulemaking.pdf 
(displaying a checklist containing “all the necessary information” for a complete 
Section 333 petition, including operator name and address, regulations from 
which relief is sought, safe operation and benefit the public interest justifications, 
proposed operations, and the “make and model” of the aircraft, not including 
operational manuals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 96. See id. (describing the requirements of the checklist). 
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operators, which is aimed at “opening pathways towards fully 
integrating UAS into the Nation’s airspace.”97  
The rule’s provisions are designed to minimize risks to other 
aircraft and people and property on the ground. The regulations 
require pilots to keep an unmanned aircraft within visual line 
of sight. Operations are allowed during daylight and during 
twilight if the drone has anti-collision lights. The new 
regulations also address height and speed restrictions and other 
operational limits, such as prohibiting flights over unprotected 
people on the ground who aren’t directly participating in the 
UAS operation.98 
Essentially, Rule 107 creates an operational version of the 
temporary restrictions, leaving most of them in place with only 
minor changes.99 Consequently, the FAA’s efforts continue to fall 
woefully short in addressing the use of drones to collect data on 
people or property.100 
A regulatory regime that does not address the technical 
capabilities of this technology presents a great risk to the future 
subjects of its application.101 Without guidance, courts will 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Press Release—DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June 21, 2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515 (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2016) [hereinafter DOT and FAA Finalize Rules] (describing the 
main goals of the “first operational set of rules for routine commercial use of small 
unmanned aircraft systems” and outlining Rule 107’s goals from a policy 
perspective) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. (outlining restrictions on line-of-sight piloting, maximum height 
and speed restrictions, daytime-only flight permissions, pilot age restrictions, and 
“remote pilot certificate” requirements). Note that Rule 107 essentially mirrors 
the temporary restrictions explained previously, at least with regard to its focus 
on the physical attributes of the drone and the conduct of its flight pattern. See 
supra notes 93–95 (outlining the focal points of the temporary Section 333 
exemption and temporary restrictions set out by the FAA).  
 100. See DOT and FAA Finalize Rules, supra note 97; 
Although the new rule does not specifically deal with privacy issues in 
the use of drones, and the FAA does not regulate how UAS gather data 
on people or property, the FAA is acting to address privacy 
considerations in this area. The FAA strongly encourages all UAS 
pilots to check local and state laws before gathering information 
through remote sensing technology or photography. 
Id. 
 101. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Rules of the Sky, SLATE (Feb. 25, 2015, 7:47 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/faa_small_ 
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struggle to evaluate the fairness of drones’ analytics, calculations, 
and data collection through a legal lens.102 As a result, unfair 
discriminatory insurance practices may become inevitable where a 
court has only subjective state law to go on and no guidance in 
evaluating the effects of the technology itself.103 As of now, the 
government’s efforts to provide this guidance through commercial 
drone regulations have fallen woefully short.104 
IV. Potential Influences of Risk Assessment Drones on Unfairly 
Discriminatory Insurance Practices and Disparate Impacts  
The question remains what effect the introduction of 
commercial drones will have on unfairly discriminatory insurance 
practices and whether their use will result in disparate impacts. 
Exploration of these effects is largely hypothetical, considering the 
limited use of drones to date.105 This, however, does not dampen 
the importance of understanding the trajectory of this technology 
                                                                                                     
commercial_drone_rules_don_t_adequately_address_privacy_concerns.2.html (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (arguing that the FAA’s current “ad hoc” certification system, 
as well as the proposed rules it has produced, are overly concerned with aircraft 
safety and operation, and not concerned with the cameras and capabilities of the 
drones, and the consequences they carry) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 102. See Jeremy Kun, Big Data Algorithms Can Discriminate, and It’s Not 
Clear What to Do About It, GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Big-Data-Algorithms-Can-Discriminate-
and-Its-Not-Clear-What-to-Do-About-It.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (arguing 
that “an even deeper problem [with evaluating fairness of data collection 
algorithms] is that nobody has agreed on what it means for an algorithm to be 
fair in the first place”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 103. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text (discussing how courts are 
forced to apply subjective patterns of analysis to “fairness” evaluations and how 
state anti-discrimination laws often muddle these analyses further through 
inconsistency in construction and application). 
 104. See Drones Take Flight, LLOYD’S EMERGING RISK REP. 3 (2015), 
https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news%20and%20insight/risk%20insight/20
15/drones%20take%20flight20150820.pdf (“[T]he industry is growing too rapidly 
and unevenly for regulators to provide strong oversight without technological 
support.”). 
 105. See supra notes 79–81 (stating that only four insurers have temporary 
“testing” exemptions to use risk assessment drones, and discussing their 
reasoning for implementation). 
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in the insurance field and how readily available it will become.106 
Underestimating the evolution of drones and their commercial 
capabilities could prove costly to those individuals who find 
themselves at the mercy of their implementation.107  
The central thesis of this Note is that, without adequately 
tailored regulation, the introduction of insurance risk assessment 
drones will create a rise in unfairly discriminatory insurance 
practices.108 Risk assessment drones aim to eliminate the need for 
human interaction in many situations,109 can gather and process 
rapid amounts of previously unavailable data and details,110 and 
may potentially share data with other entities to the detriment of 
the individuals being assessed.111 Each issue potentially creates 
serious difficulties for courts and lawmakers in evaluating the 
fairness of these practices. Insurers claim that their 
implementation of risk assessment drones is meant to work in 
                                                                                                     
 106. See Lyle Donan, The Drones Are Here, CLAIMS MGMT. (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://claims-management.theclm.org/home/article/drones-unmanned-aerial-
vehicles-coming-to-property-insurance-claims-industry (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) 
(“UAVs eventually will enjoy widespread adoption throughout our industry, and 
one day in the foreseeable future they will be commonplace.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 107. See Peter W. Singer, The Predator Comes Home: A Primer on Domestic 
Drones, Their Huge Business Opportunities, and Their Deep Political, Moral, and 
Legal Challenges, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/03/08-drones-singer (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the “explosion of new types [of drones], ranging in size, 
shape, and form” and how these changes are ushering in a “crucial opening-up of 
the user base and functionality of robotics,” meaning that far less training, 
understanding, and certification is required to pilot today’s drones) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 108. See supra notes 101–103 (discussing the need for an appropriately 
focused regulatory regime and the potential consequences if one is not generated 
before the introduction of insurance drones technology).  
 109. See Donan, supra note 106 (“There is a clear motive for us to use [drones] 
where they can . . . gather intelligence more cost effectively than with human 
labor.”). 
 110. See id. (“There is a clear motive for us to use [drones] where they 
can . . . aid in gathering intelligence and scaling up intelligence gathering efforts 
quickly); supra notes 82–83 (discussing the data collection technology and 
capabilities of risk assessment drones, as well as their ability to transfer data to 
other sources and recipients). 
 111. See supra notes 85–86 (discussing drone communication and third-party 
transmission capabilities, as well as instant-upload and cloud-based sharing 
software available to commercial drones). 
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tandem with human agents, not faze them out.112 However, the 
potential consequences loom larger than insurers would like to 
admit, and the American public remains skeptical.113  
A. Erosion of the Relationship Between Insurers and Insureds 
To begin, the introduction of drones into insurance practices 
necessitates a decrease in human interaction during property 
surveillance, claims adjustment, and risk assessment.114 Insurers’ 
desire to use drones to reach areas that are inaccessible to humans, 
as well as to gather and analyze large portions of data in real time, 
supports this inevitability.115 Specifically, Erie Insurance stated 
that they would use test drones to replace human agents in certain 
underwriting and claims processes.116 Immediate concerns arise 
over the number and competency of those individuals operating the 
drones in practice.117 Some argue that this reduction in the human 
                                                                                                     
 112. See Young Ha, Erie Insurance Receives FAA Approval to Use Drones in 
Claims, Underwriting, INS. J. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal. 
com/news/east/2015/04/15/364525.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review) 
At ERIE, we see drones as high tech meets human touch . . . . Drones 
will help our claims adjusters get an early look at potential damage 
without putting themselves in harm’s way due to unsafe conditions, 
such as on a steep roof or at the site of a fire or natural disaster. 
Id. 
 113. See Joan Lowy & Jennifer Agiesta, Americans Skeptical Benefits of 
Commercial Drones Will Outweigh Privacy, Safety Risks, SUAS NEWS (Dec. 19, 
2014), http://www.suasnews.com/2014/12/33443/americans-skeptical-benefits-of-
commercial-drones-will-outweigh-privacy-safety-risks/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) 
(“By a 2-1 margin, those who had an opinion opposed using drones for commercial 
purposes. Only 21 percent favored commercial use of drones, compared with 43 
percent opposed. Another 35 percent were in the middle.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 114. See supra notes 79–81 (naming the insurers currently approved for 
exemptions to use risk assessment drones and the stated goal of USAA to use 
them in an effort to reduce the number of human agents working in the field). 
 115. See supra notes 109–110 (dissecting the insurers’ desire and 
commentators’ calls for risk assessment drones to replace human agents, reach 
inaccessible areas, and increase the size and speed of data collection and 
analysis). 
 116. See Ha, supra note 112 (“Erie Insurance said the company will be using 
two drones it currently has for claims and underwriting. ‘We’ll be using the two 
drones we have for claims and for underwriting rather than simply research.’”). 
 117. See Donan, supra note 106 (“Professional training programs also will be 
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workforce is not necessarily a present concern because 
professionals are still often required to evaluate the drones’ 
operations and collected data.118 While that may be true, the major 
issue remains whether the denial of the opportunity to interact 
personally with an insurance agent constitutes or promotes 
unfairly discriminatory insurance practices.  
“The insurer has a duty to conduct a ‘reasonable investigation’ 
before denying a claim.”119 Failure to reasonably investigate claims 
before denial may result in extended liability through “bad faith 
insurance claims practices as defined by [the relevant statute].”120 
At best, it is questionable whether an investigation without 
meaningful interaction between the insurer and insured is 
“reasonable.”121 Such interaction allows for explanations, 
discussions, and a free exchange of information before or during a 
thorough analysis, and has traditionally been considered integral 
to the claims adjustment process.122 By eliminating this 
relationship, society risks promoting a process where robotic 
analytics pre-determine the rating of an individual or group 
without offering them a chance to be heard.123 Consider AIG’s own 
                                                                                                     
necessary . . . even an experienced pilot would know that you cannot just grab the 
sticks of a UAV controller and be a safe, competent operator overnight. The 
necessary skills take time to practice, learn, and refine.”). 
 118. See id. (dismissing immediate concerns over drones “simply [replacing] 
the human workforce one day” because “the data they collect can be cumbersome 
and complex” and is “often useless without professional evaluation”). 
 119. 1 JEFFREY E. THOMAS & FRANCIS J. MOOTZ, NEW APPLEMAN ON INS. LAW 
LIB. ED. § 4.06(2) (2013). 
 120. Id. 
 121. This brings the debate back to the courts, which will struggle to 
subjectively evaluate whether such a denial was fair or unfair without much 
guidance from policy or regulation. See supra Part II (discussing generally the 
current state of subjective standards for judicial evaluation of fairness and 
reasonableness in potentially discriminatory insurance practices). 
 122. See The Claims Adjustment Process, LAPOINTE INS., 
http://www.lapointeins.com/claims-center/the-claims-adjustment/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the claims adjustment process, highlighting the 
interaction between claims adjusters and the insured through a home visit or a 
series of visits, and the need for a full preparation and exchange of information 
and details between the adjuster and the insured to ensure “a thorough and 
complete evaluation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 123.  See Paul J. Gough, Erie Insurance Hopes These Are Drones They’re 
Looking for, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015, 7:49 AM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/blog/morning-edition/2015/04/erie-insur 
ance-hopes-these-are-drones-theyre.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing 
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vision for its risk assessment drones, which focuses on the 
relationship between the agent and his drone, not the agent and 
the insured.124 It is no great leap to realize the severity of allowing 
such practices to become the norm without adequate constraints. 
Without a consistent guidepost, how can courts be expected to 
evaluate the fairness or reasonableness of this rapid evolution that 
potentially alienates the insured?125  
B. Potential Abuse of Data-Collection Capabilities 
The unprecedented data-collection capabilities of drones 
simultaneously present one of their biggest advantages and one of 
their greatest discriminatory risks.126 The obvious advantage of 
commercial drones in claims adjustment and risk assessment is 
that they are capable of viewing, scanning, and analyzing large 
spaces in detail.127 Insurers envision this data as “another tool in 
                                                                                                     
Erie Insurance Co.’s exploration into commercial risk assessment and 
underwriting drones, and posing the question of whether “a robotic claims 
adjuster [is] far behind?”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
company is even exploring drones and robots capable of traversing the actual 
terrain of an insured’s home to analyze it. See id. (“[Erie Insurance] has even been 
in exploratory talks with a company that makes robots that can move across an 
asphalt shingle.”). 
 124. See Poised to Take off: A Harvard Business Review Analytic Services 
Report, HARV. BUS. REV. 4 (2015), http://www.aig.com/Chartis/internet/US/en/ 
19460_HBR_AIG%20Report_UAV_tcm3171-709936.pdf (discussing an AIG-
sponsored report stating that “UASs can also improve underwriting, enabling 
carriers to more accurately assess candidates for insurance . . . by determining 
the probability of damage to buildings, helping insurers to determine where they 
should assign high deductibles, and advising the insured on loss prevention 
measures”). The report goes on to espouse the same goals mentioned in this Note 
by other insurers, focusing on efficiency and the reduction of the need for site 
visits and specialists. See id. (“UASs can make the claims adjustment process less 
expensive and time-consuming by cutting down on the need for multiple site visits 
by different specialists.”). 
 125. See supra Part II (discussing generally the current discrepancies in the 
substantive evaluations of state courts and the lack of consistency and 
predictability in their evaluation of fairness in challenges to discriminatory 
insurance practices). 
 126. See MEASURE, INC., supra note 85, at 90 (describing common 
high-resolution cameras and laser-mapping features of risk assessment and other 
commercial surveillance drones, as well as other data collection and sharing 
capabilities). 
 127. See id. (describing commercial drone data-gathering capabilities); see 
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the toolbox” for claims adjusters and underwriters when 
evaluating property.128 Some have even postulated that these 
drones can transfer collected data to third parties (such as 
attorneys) to streamline the process.129 Lost in this excitement, 
however, is the potential for discriminatory insurance practices 
resulting from an unfair abuse of these abilities. 
Discriminatory insurance practices can take many forms, 
including a practice commonly referred to as redlining.130 Insurers 
have long toed the line between fair and unfair discrimination in 
the rating and underwriting processes; however, many courts have 
found redlining to be a line in the sand.131 While insurers argue 
that there is a demonstrated need for some discrimination in risk 
classification,132 courts have not extended their sympathies nearly 
                                                                                                     
generally supra Part III (discussing generally the current state of commercial 
drone technology, including common hardware and software, cameras, laser-
mapping, and data sharing). 
 128. See Gough, supra note 123 (quoting Erie Insurance as describing the use 
of drones in underwriting and claims adjustment as “another tool in the toolbox” 
for its insurance agents). 
 129. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (describing cloud-based 
computing and data-sharing software in commercial drones, and discussing the 
potential uses of that software for third-party data sharing and storage). 
 130. See Emily Badger, Redlining: Still a Thing, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG 
(May 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/28/ 
evidence-that-banks-still-deny-black-borrowers-just-as-they-did-50-years-ago/ 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the roots of redlining stemming from the 
Home Owner’s Loan Corporation’s practice of drafting maps of American 
communities throughout the 1930s to determine which citizens were “worthy of 
mortgage lending”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The article 
goes on to describe redlining’s racial connotations throughout history and its 
continuance in certain forms today. See id. (detailing the FHA’s outlawing of the 
practice in 1968 and subsequent practices that continued, such as predatory 
lending and banking tactics, “retail redlining,” and the housing discrimination 
case between Associated Banking and HUD in Wisconsin in 2008). 
 131. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (discussing the Cisneros 
court’s definition of redlining as any situation where the insurer charges higher 
rates or declines to write insurance for people who live in particular areas and its 
holding that such practices were unfairly discriminatory within the constraints 
of the relevant statute). 
 132. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 5 (asserting that laws limiting risk 
classification practices that resemble redlining “implicate a tradeoff between 
efficiency and fairness” and that, while this limitation is necessary, these laws 
can promulgate poor rating systems if no discrimination is allowed); see, e.g., 
Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 
71 VA. L. REV. 403, 420–50 (1985) (reiterating the concept of the efficiency/fairness 
tradeoff and the importance of a balance between limiting insurers’ ability to 
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as far as insurers would like.133 Courts (and other parties) who 
support limitations on insurance discrimination often champion 
fairness-based arguments, highlighting the danger of fragmenting 
communities through unfair risk classification.134 The 
data-collection capabilities of risk assessment drones present a 
tempting Pandora’s box from which new forms of redlining may be 
released if left unchecked.135 Insurers have already shown their 
willingness to use evolving technology such as satellite imagery to 
push the discriminatory envelope under the guise of efficiency.136 
In many cases, although the state regulators condemn the practice 
as unfairly discriminatory redlining, they lack the legal capability 
to stop it.137 One article quotes Insurance Commissioner John 
                                                                                                     
discriminate and allowing for some necessary consideration of differing risks 
presented by each policyholder); Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic 
Information in Insurance Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 211, 211–12 (2005) 
(“Economists can contribute to this debate [about regulating genetic information 
in insurance markets] . . . . [B]y casting the problem as a classic efficiency-equity 
trade-off. . . .”). 
 133. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (reiterating the Cisneros 
holding). 
 134. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 6 (“[Fairness-based] arguments embrace 
a vision of insurance as [a] solidarity . . . . Risk classification undermines this 
vision . . . by splitting communities into ever smaller and more fragmented risk 
pools, particularly when it trades on preexisting social inequities and 
stereotypes.”). “Even when actuarial correlations between characteristics and 
risk can be demonstrated, defenders of risk classification regulation emphasize 
that this correlation is socially constructed, reflecting existing norms, 
assumptions, and biases that frame both the collection and analysis of the data 
that produces risk assessments.” Id. 
 135. See generally supra Part III (giving a general primer on current models 
of commercial drones and the technological capabilities they possess or may 
possess in the near future).  
 136. See Insurers Using Satellite Photos to Determine Fire Risk, INS. J. (Sept. 
27, 2004), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2004/09/27/46293.htm 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (detailing a California insurer’s use of satellite imagery 
to deny renewal of coverage to individuals whose property was located near wild 
brush, and discussing the state regulators’ condemnation of the practice as 
redlining that could lead to arbitrary cancellation of policies) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 137. See id. (“[S]tate regulators say the practice is a form of redlining, 
discriminating against particular neighborhoods, and could lead to policies being 
arbitrarily canceled. Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi called it a serious 
problem but said he does not have the legal right to stop it.”). Insurers argued for 
the positive aspects of the practice, focusing on efficiency instead of fairness. See 
id. (“Pete Moraga, spokesman for Insurance Information Network of California, a 
media relations organization supported by insurers, said use of satellite 
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Garamendi as he condemns the practice further: “Insurance 
companies are using satellite imagery and just plain photos to 
redline vast areas of the state without taking into account the 
individual circumstances of an individual home.”138 The public 
largely shares this aversion to such abuses of technology in the 
underwriting process.139 It is not difficult, then, to envision a 
similar struggle with operations of risk assessment drones that 
result in insurers’ unchecked access to data without interaction 
with the insured.140  
C. Unchecked Information-Sharing with Third Parties  
Finally, the potential for risk assessment drones to transfer 
the information they collect and analyze to third parties without 
the insured’s knowledge or consent is a concern too great to ignore. 
Data sharing has been lauded as a valuable attribute of many 
drones, including those aimed at risk assessment and claims 
adjustment.141 In the age of cloud-based data sharing and 
seemingly unlimited access to information, this evolution has 
naturally expanded to drones.142 Gathering, processing, and 
                                                                                                     
technology may prove to be positive if it makes the industry more efficient.”). 
 138. Id.  
 139. See, e.g., id. (interviewing Sheree DiCicco, a policyholder denied coverage 
due to her property’s proximity to brush—“I didn’t know insurance companies 
would, or even could, do such a thing”). The article also quotes Harvey Rosenfield, 
the Spokesman for the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights. See id. 
(“I’d not heard of this before; it’s scary. . . . It has a creepy, intrusive aspect to it.”). 
 140. See id. (“Increasingly, however, insurance companies are using satellites 
to identify homes at high risk of fire damage because of their proximity to brush, 
a development that alarms some state regulators . . . .”). Compare this satellite 
usage to the routine sweeps and scans of the property surrounding an area using 
a drone’s on-board cameras during an assessment or claims adjustment 
envisioned by insurers like Erie Insurance and AIG, and a disconcerting 
similarity in operation emerges. See Gough, supra note 123 (discussing Erie 
Insurance’s vision of drones being used to aid in underwriting and property 
assessment); HARV. BUS. REV., supra note 124, at 4 (describing AIG’s intent to use 
drones to assess the probability of damage to buildings (similar to the satellite 
usage) and help insurers determine where they should assign high deductibles). 
 141. See MEASURE, INC., supra note 85, at 7 (exploring the third-party 
transmission and data-sharing capabilities of the latest models of commercial 
drones). 
 142. See Colin Snow, Drones Revolution Means Big Data Cloud Services, 
DIGITALIST MAG. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.digitalistmag.com/digital-
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sharing data is often considered the primary goal of most 
commercial drone operations.143 Anything beyond a cursory glance 
at the current landscape, however, reveals the dangers of this 
unfettered information exchange.144 Insurers could potentially 
share data with third-party experts, evaluators, or even other 
agencies without the knowledge or consent of the insured, and may 
even use “middle-man” companies to process and share this 
data.145  
State legislatures have already shown that the transfer and 
disclosure of information pertaining to private property will not be 
treated lightly.146 Rules and regulations limiting data collection, 
                                                                                                     
economy/2014/02/18/drones-revolution-and-big-data-cloud-services-01244771 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the future of data sharing and analytics 
through cloud-based software in drones, including PrecisionHawk’s 
PrecisionMapper service, which it calls “a cloud-based application that gives 
anyone the ability to upload, store, process, and share their aerial image data”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 143. See id. (discussing drones’ prolific application as data-collection vehicles 
that can process and share massive amounts of data in useful formats to third 
parties and consumers, such as farm and crop data like crop yield, feed and 
livestock replenishing windows, and other micro-analyses). 
 144. After all, insurers are beginning to use shared information from other 
technological providers, such as social media, to adjust premiums and conduct 
risk-discriminatory underwriting. See Anita Ramasastry, Will Insurers Begin to 
Use Social Media Postings to Calculate Premiums?, VERDICT (Jan. 3, 2012), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2012/01/03/will-insurers-begin-to-use-social-media-
postings-to-calculate-premiums (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (explaining comments 
regarding current insurer uses of social media posts and profiles to detect fraud 
or misrepresentations, and examining predictions from insurance analysts that 
the insurance industry is and will continue to trend towards research activity that 
will aid in underwriting and risk discrimination) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 145. See Denise Johnson, In-Depth Study Reveals How Drones Can Help in 
All Phases of a Disaster, CLAIMS J. (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2015/05/18/263420.htm (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the practical applications of real-time data processing 
and sharing through risk assessment and claims adjustment drones, as well as 
the use of third-party companies like Measure, Inc., to process and share the data 
with parties as directed by the insurer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The article used the example of assessment and claims adjustment 
during pre- and post-disaster efforts. See id. (discussing how data sharing and 
middle man companies could aid insurers by processing and sharing the data as 
needed so that insurers need not maintain a large drone fleet). 
 146. See Amy O’Connor, Insurers Warned to ‘Think Before You Snap’ as 
Florida Drone Privacy Law Takes Flight, INS. J. (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/07/29/376560.htm (last 
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transfer, exchange, and access are necessary to protect 
policyholders.147 Without them, insurers and third parties may 
share information they would not have otherwise had access to and 
produce discriminatory assessments and ratings.148 
The introduction of commercial drones into commercial 
fields like risk assessment and claims adjustment is clearly 
inevitable.149 However, with new technology comes a responsibility 
to develop and maintain adequate, proactive policy standards 
governing its use.150 This Note does not fear the age of the drone, 
nor herald their coming as some imminent doom of the insured.151 
This Note is not a zealous prophet of some great technopanic.152 
                                                                                                     
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (examining a Florida law that prohibits image-capturing of 
a person or their private property unless it is within the scope of authorization, 
and discussing the uncertainty as to how courts will approach insurers’ collection 
and sharing of data via drones for risk assessment and claims adjustment) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This Note does not discuss drone 
privacy issues in detail, but the overlap between privacy concerns and the 
potential for unfairly discriminatory practices through the acquisition of 
drone-gathered data via unilateral sharing is worth noting. See id. (“The 
insurance industry is all about managing risk and the moral of the story is think 
before you snap that picture . . . . Instead, identify the use of drone technology in 
the insurance policy and let the insured know they may be filmed during the 
adjustment process.”). 
 147. See Lindsey Harriman & Joseph Muhlhausen, A New Eye in the Sky: Eco-
Drones, UNEP GLOBAL ENVTL. ALERT SERV. 1, 9 (2013), 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP-GEAS_MAY_2013.pdf (discussing the need for 
data sharing standards to be created for the operation of environmental mapping 
and surveillance drones, especially in areas not native to the operator). 
 148. See id. (warning of the potential for unchecked data sharing to grant 
people or entities access to data that they otherwise would not, or should not, have 
had). 
 149. See id. at 9 (“According to a 2012 United States Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, the number of countries with a UAV system 
for military, commercial, or civil use grew from 41 countries in 2004 to 76 
countries by 2011.”). 
 150. See id. (asserting that, “as UAVs become more prevalent in the public 
and private sectors for research and non-military surveillance, many policy 
considerations will need to be made,” and discussing several forms of regulation 
that will likely be necessary for research and surveillance drones in the future). 
 151. See ADAM THERIER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE 
FOR COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 22 (2014) (“Unsurprisingly, 
however, private drones have also raised many safety, security, and privacy 
concerns. . . . Many [advocates] fear that commercial drones will soon darken our 
skies and create an omnipresent panopticon.”).  
 152. See id. at 21–22 (defining “technopanic” as “intense public, political, and 
academic responses to the emergence or use of media or technologies,” and 
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Instead, it aims to identify a glaring concern and the need to 
address it.153 Without a competent regulatory regime specifically 
targeted at risk assessment and claims adjustment processes, 
commercial drones remain an open door to redlining and other 
discriminatory insurance practices.154 Courts cannot be expected 
to unify and create predictable standards of use on their own; 
policyholders deserve a better system than state-by-state 
regulation and a lack of predictable enforcement and restraint on 
insurers.155 The questions then posed are (1) what must be 
included in such a regulatory scheme, and (2) who has the power 
and ability to enact it?156 
V. Proposed Regulatory Framework for Insurance Drones  
Proposing a sufficient regulatory framework for risk 
assessment drones requires (1) an understanding of current 
regulatory efforts towards commercial drones,157 (2) an 
                                                                                                     
identifying root causes and trends that inspire this fear and drive activism 
against technological innovation).  
 153. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text (restating the thesis of 
this Note as the potential for an increase in unfairly discriminatory insurance 
practices resulting from the introduction of commercial risk assessment drones). 
 154. See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text (discussing insurers’ 
current usage of evolving technology to discriminate in underwriting and risk 
assessment, and drawing parallels to potential uses of drone technology). 
 155. See Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for 




the impending conflicts brought by commercial drones, and recommending core 
considerations for legislators, including a property rights approach to aerial 
surveillance, strict data retention, storage, and transfer procedures, transparency 
and accountability for operators, and duration-based surveillance regulations). 
 156. See id. at 2 (discussing the current state of drone legislation and its focus 
on technological capabilities as opposed to perceived or recognized harms, and the 
inadequacies that have followed, introducing ideas of what might be included in 
a better regulatory scheme, and noting the importance of having the right parties 
enact reforms). 
 157. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (outlining the current 
regulatory schemes introduced by the FAA, preliminary restrictions on 
commercial drone use, the process for exemptions, and its limitation in scope). See 
generally Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (framing the FAA’s task of creating rules 
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examination of how risk assessment drones may leave individuals 
susceptible to unfairly discriminatory practices and what 
countermeasures are available against those risks, and (3) an 
evaluation of which entities (if any) are suitable to introduce such 
countermeasures.158  
Drone use in the commercial context is still a regulatory blank 
slate, relying only on temporary FAA operational standards.159 
Industry-specific uses, particularly in an insurance risk 
assessment and claims adjustment context, have yet to be 
addressed in detail.160 While the current FAA structure offers only 
                                                                                                     
for the integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace, and 
discussing the preliminary restrictions in place while rulemaking is underway). 
 158. See Thomas Gounley, Commercial Use of Drones: With Strict FAA 
Regulation, Some Locally Wait for Exemption, Others Just Fly, SPRINGFIELD 
NEWS-LEADER (July 2, 2015), http://www.news-
leader.com/story/news/business/2015/07/15/commercial-use-drones-strict-faa-
regulation-locally-wait-exemption-others-just-fly/30146599/ (last visited Oct. 1, 
2016) (interviewing various entrepreneurs to demonstrate the FAA’s current 
monopoly on allowing or restricting any commercial operation of UAVs) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). However, many suggest that the 
FAA’s ability to regulate and restrict commercial drone operation in the national 
airspace is limited, both in the scope of coverage and applicability to the public. 
See Peter Sachs, Current U.S. Federal Drone Law, DRONE L.J. (Dec. 14, 
2013), http://dronelawjournal.com/ (last updated Dec. 25, 2015) (last visited Oct. 
1, 2016) (discussing the current extent of FAA regulations on commercial drone 
operation, arguments that the FAA Modernization and Reform Act and the 
proposed rulemakings for commercial drone integration do not always apply to 
the general public, and commenting on the limitations in the scope of coverage of 
current drone legislation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jeff 
Foster, Keep Calm: The FAA and sUAVs/Drone Rules, PROVIDEO COALITION 
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.provideocoalition.com/drone-law-update-faa (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“[T]he FAA can't make laws—only develop guidelines and 
regulations. The federal government has no authority whatsoever to regulate the 
operation of remote-controlled model aircraft.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 159. See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text (explaining the operation 
of current FAA commercial drone regulations, the process of FAA’s proposed 
rulemaking, the current process for obtaining an exemption, and the expected 
trajectory and limits of the FAA’s rulemaking). 
 160. See Miriam McNabb, Regulations Matter: 3 Regions Crushing the U.S. in 
Drone Industry, DRONELIFE.COM (Jan. 8, 2016), http://dronelife.com/2016/01/08/ 
regulations-matter-3-regions-crushing-the-u-s-in-drone-industry/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the United States’ lack of industry-specific guidelines 
and regulations for companies wishing to enter the market and the economic 
impact this is having as those entities pursue activity in drone-friendly climates 
like China and Brazil) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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preliminary testing exemptions,161 drone technology will most 
likely spread to the insurance industry in the coming years. 
Without targeted restrictions from appropriate entities on usage, 
data collection, analysis, and information sharing, the likelihood of 
abuse resulting in unfairly discriminatory insurance practices 
remains dangerously high. 
A. Current Regulatory Efforts and Inadequacies  
At the outset, it is prudent to take stock of current regulatory 
efforts that will impact the integration of commercial drones into 
the insurance industry.162 As discussed previously, the FAA has 
been tasked with facilitating commercial drone integration into the 
national airspace across all industries and uses.163 The scope of the 
FAA’s mandate, however, is limited to regulating the physical 
operation and registration of drones in the airspace.164 This narrow 
authority, combined with a sluggish preliminary regulatory period, 
has led to uncertainty as to the future of industry-specific 
regulations for this evolving technology.165 Current efforts focus on 
the operator’s flight conditions and visibility, as well as maximum 
altitude and drone size restrictions.166 In addition, initial 
                                                                                                     
 161. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (discussing the scope, 
process, and requirements of a temporary exception to “test” commercial drone 
operations). 
 162. See generally supra Part III (discussing the development of commercial 
drone integration restrictions, exemptions, and other FAA processes). 
 163. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA’s mandate 
on national airspace integration, and providing general background on the 
Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 and its 
implications). 
 164. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-381, at 64 (2012) (Conf. Rep.) (detailing the 
objectives of Section 332 of the Act, which focus on the FAA’s mandate to provide 
for “acceptable standards for operation and certification of civil unmanned 
aircraft,” and prioritizing registration and operator certification procedures). 
 165. See Alan Levin, FAA’s Power to Police Civilian Drones Bolstered by 
Decision, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 18, 2014, 8:48 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-18/drone-flights-over-sports-
events-subject-to-faa-rules-ntsb-says (last updated Nov. 18, 2014, 2:49 PM) (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“[T]here are still unresolved questions about how drone 
flights will be regulated and a community of users increasingly frustrated with 
the FAA’s slow action . . . . At least three other court cases challenging FAA 
authority are pending.”) (on file the with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 166. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (listing the requirements for 
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regulatory attempts by the FAA and the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) imposed mandatory registration and fee 
requirements for commercial pilots.167 However, any positive 
impact of this legislation was tempered because the exemption 
format prohibited commercial users from piloting without a 
registered exemption—essentially presenting an analogous 
registration-style barrier.168 This registration scheme operates as 
a logistical hindrance on the industry rather than a regulatory aid 
to integration, and odds are its successors will similarly inhibit 
progress.169 Some have even alleged that the FAA’s efforts are in 
danger of violating the constitutional requirements of due 
process.170 The publication of Final Rule 107 has done little to allay 
                                                                                                     
receiving an exemption under Section 333 of the Act, focusing on weight, 
maximum altitude, and visual line of sight requirements for the drone and 
operator); see also supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text (demonstrating the 
limitations of Final Rule 107 and the FAA’s intentional focus on physical flight 
restrictions and disregard of data collection and privacy issues). 
 167. See Keith Laing, Feds Announce Drone Registration Requirements,  HILL 
(Dec. 14, 2015, 10:17 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/263106-feds-
announce-drone-registration-requirements (Oct. 1, 2016) (“The [DOT] said drone 
users will have to register their devices by Feb. 19, 2016, in a new Web-based 
tracking system . . . . The agency is imposing a $5 fee for drone 
registrations . . . but the FAA said it is waiving the charge for the first 30 days of 
the new requirement.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 168. See Petitioning for Exemption, supra note 93 (outlining the procedure for 
procuring an exemption for pre-regulation commercial drone “testing,” and 
discussing the prohibition of flights not authorized by such an exemption). 
 169. See Laing, supra note 167 (“Drone advocates had urged the FAA not to 
impose registration fees in the new documentation system that is being set up to 
help the federal government keep track of the devices, arguing that the charge 
would deter drone operators from complying with the new requirements.”); Eli 
Dourado, The Government Is Rushing Out an Ill-Conceived Plan to Regulate 
Consumer Drones, VOX TECH. (Nov. 12, 2015, 8:30 AM), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/11/12/9716350/drones-obama-faa-christmas (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Unless the FAA decides to exempt small, consumer drones, 
kids who get Millennium Falcon drones for Christmas may have to wait until they 
are registered with the FAA to play with them—or face jail time.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 170. See Keith Laing, Critics Threaten Lawsuit Over Drone Registration 
Rules, THE HILL (Dec. 14, 2015, 3:12 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/ 
263164-critics-threaten-lawsuit-over-faa-drone-registration-rules (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2016) (“The Washington, D.C.-based Competitive Enterprise Institute said 
Monday the FAA violated federal requirements for allowing public comments on 
the drone registration proposal, which usually lasts for a period of 30 to 60 days.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Marc Scribner, transportation 
policy expert for the Competitive Enterprise Institute, stated “The FAA’s claim 
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these concerns, due in large part to the fact that restrictions on 
piloting are vague, apply only to small-scale, non-hobby 
commercial drones, and still require permit-style certificates of 
authorization for flight.171 
With specific regard to the insurance industry, it appears that 
the FAA may have some power to regulate acceptable data 
collection, use, and sharing guidelines.172 Although this power 
seems limited to approval, it remains controversial due to the lack 
of data collection laws.173 Many interest groups and political 
watchdogs have already spoken towards issues of privacy and 
security,174 but commentary from similar players on 
industry-specific uses for commercial drones—including insurance 
                                                                                                     
that complying with notice and comment requirements for small drone 
registration regulation is ‘impracticable and contrary to the public interest,’ so 
that it can therefore ignore them, is as predictable as it is absurd.” Id. 
 171. See Press Release, supra note 97 (“To qualify for a remote pilot certificate, 
an individual must either pass an initial aeronautical knowledge test at an FAA-
approved knowledge testing center or have an existing non-student Part 61 pilot 
certificate.”).  
 172. See John Dyer, FAA Approves Corporation’s Use of Drones to Collect 
Data, Prompting Protest from Privacy Advocates, VICE NEWS (Sep. 2, 2015, 4:53 
PM), https://news.vice.com/article/faa-approves-corporations-use-of-drones-to-
collect-data-prompting-protest-from-privacy-advocates (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) 
(detailing the FAA’s approval of Measure, Inc.’s commercial drone exemption for 
a fleet of “aerial data acquisition” drones, mostly to be used for disaster relief 
efforts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 173. See id. (“‘Right now there are virtually no laws to address the commercial 
use of drones to collect massive amounts of data on the public,’ said Jeramie Scott, 
national security counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center . . . . 
‘Drones are basically flying surveillance platforms . . . .’”). 
 174. See The Canadian Press, Drones Should Be Restricted Near Homes, 
Schoolyards, Privacy Watchdog Says, CBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2015, 12:27 PM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/drones-privacy-commissioner-1.3299892 (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Drones can be outfitted with high-powered zoom lenses, 
night-vision or infrared-imaging systems, and video software that can recognize 
specific people . . . . These features demand an emphasis on personal protection 
in regulations and licensing standards, the commissioner's office says in its 
submission to the advisory council.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Michelle L. Price, States Are Itching to Use Drones, But Privacy 
Watchdogs Say Not So Fast, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2014, 8:17 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/states-drones-privacy_n_4940365.html 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing various legislative efforts of Utah, 
California, and other western states, as well as the positions of lobbyists like 
Citizens Education Project, in regards to integrating drone usage into use by state 
agencies, police, and other official groups, as well as commercial entities) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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practices—has been scarce. After the FAA’s latest publication, it 
appears they will continue to avert their gaze from these issues in 
disappointing—but not necessarily surprising—fashion.175 
Congress has tasked some agencies with researching and 
compiling “best practices” for commercial drone use.176 However, 
many of these are likely outside of the insurance scope and amount 
to little more than non-binding guidelines for use.177 Consequently, 
it is clear that current efforts have done little to point the 
insurance industry’s use of commercial drones in a comprehensible 
direction.178 
B. Identification of Risks and Exploration of Countermeasures to 
Unfair Discrimination and Disparate Impact  
Although the constitutional and regulatory landscapes remain 
barren for now,179 all is not lost for insureds that find themselves 
                                                                                                     
 175. See supra notes 99–100 (quoting Final Rule 107 to demonstrate that it 
does not address the use of drones for data collection of people and property and 
that the FAA is still “gathering data” on such issues). 
 176. See Harley Geiger, CDT Proposes Privacy Best Practices For Drones, CTR. 
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Dec. 16, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/cdt-proposes-privacy-
best-practices-for-drones/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“CDT is proposing 
comprehensive voluntary privacy best practices for private use of drones—both 
commercial and non-commercial.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 177. See Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and 
Accountability, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 22, 2015), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/combined_draft_working_group_
12_22_2015.pdf (discussing the NTIA’s federal mandate to receive public notice 
and comment and issue “best practices” for commercial and private drone use, 
which recommend practices for everything from data security to maintaining a 
familiarity with evolving federal regulation).  
 178. See Drones—Unmanned Airsystems, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS 
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_drones.htm (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016) (stating that “[w]ith the commercial use of drones expected to expand 
rapidly in about five years, it is paramount to have established rules regulating 
their use,” and underscoring the lack of current industry-specific regulations on 
drone use) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 179. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding 
that aerial surveillance photography used primarily for mapmaking and “site 
inspection” was not an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment); 
McNeal, supra note 155, at 6–8 (discussing the development of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the subject of aerial surveillance technology, including Fourth 
Amendment implications, and the potential conflict that commercial and private 
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at the mercy of these autonomous agents. Previously, this Note 
addressed certain discriminatory insurance practices looming as 
dangerous consequences of the drone revolution.180 The next step 
is to identify countermeasures against unfair discrimination and 
disparate impact in the context of risk assessment and claims 
adjustment, a process that some states have already begun.181 This 
will generate a much-needed policy framework addressing the 
collection, sharing, and discriminatory applications of drone-
gathered information.182  
1. Method for Identifying Potential Risks and Countermeasures  
First and foremost, we must decide the method by which these 
regulatory countermeasures are identified and constructed. Some 
interested scholars recommend avoiding broad, sweeping 
restrictions like the FAA’s current efforts.183 This is because, in 
any context, a lack of specificity does more harm than good, 
                                                                                                     
drone use poses due to a lack of regulations addressing how they fit into that 
jurisprudence). 
 180. See generally supra Part IV (discussing unfairly discriminatory 
insurance practices and the increase in their potential through the integration of 
commercial drones into the risk assessment and claims adjustment processes). 
 181. See Amy Clarke Burns, S.C. Considers the Promise and Potential for 
Abuse of Drones, STATE (Aug. 19, 2015, 8:18 PM), http://www. 
thestate.com/news/state/south-carolina/article31578377.html (last visited Oct. 1, 
2016) (describing the conflict between the advance of commercial drones and an 
inadequate regulatory landscape, and talking about how some states, like South 
Carolina, are not waiting for FAA regulations before introducing regulatory 
legislation at the state level) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Some of these efforts have crossed into creating criminal offenses for the misuse 
of commercial drones that could apply even outside of the risk assessment and 
claims adjustment context. See id. (“South Carolina’s pending bill would amend 
state law regarding trespassing to make it illegal to fly drones ‘upon or above the 
land of another.’”). 
 182. See id. (“‘With the newness and technology, we’ve got to have some 
guidelines that people have to follow under the law of what’s permissible,’ said 
state Sen. Thomas Alexander, a co-sponsor of the proposed legislation. ‘As we see 
more and more of that capability, there needs to be some framework as to what’s 
acceptable.’”). 
 183. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 24 (“Some jurisdictions have enacted 
limitations on how information gathered from drones may be used. Legislators 
should reject these broadly worded use restrictions that prohibit the use of any 
evidence gathered by drones in nearly any proceeding.”). 
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creating loopholes and exceptions that ultimately engulf the 
rule.184 The key here is to match potential dangers with individual, 
customized solutions, and then unite them within a synergetic, 
cohesive framework.185 From there, coordination at the federal and 
state levels will give this set of regulations the consistency 
required to realize its full potential.186 This creates sorely needed 
predictability in enforcement for courts and legislators.187 Gregory 
McNeal applies the above methodology in suggesting a similar 
regulatory approach for commercial drone use by the 
government.188 His goal is to create an “effective and clear 
legislative package” that will address the multi-faceted concerns of 
commercial drone integration.189 If an analogous “package” can be 
formulated through this Note’s proposal, the potential for unfair 
discrimination at the hands of insurance drones will reduce 
considerably. 
                                                                                                     
 184. See id. at 24–25 (exploring the situation in Alameda County, California, 
where the sheriff’s department has proposed the use of drones for crime scene 
analysis and surveillance, and evaluating the opposing concerns that highlight 
the regulation’s inability to stop the sheriff from using the data for “untold other 
purposes”). 
 185. As an analogous example, consider the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA)’s recent announcement of its commercial drone integration plan. See 
Proposal to Create Common Rules for Operating Drones in Europe, EUROPEAN 
AVIATION SAFETY ADMIN. 2 (Sept. 2015), https://easa.europa.eu/ 
system/files/dfu/205933-01-EASA_Summary%20of%20the%20ANPA.pdf (proposing 
a regulatory framework centered around three particular “categories of 
operation” that are “based on the risk the operation is posing to third parties 
(persons and property)”). 
 186. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 25 (suggesting that legislators should 
codify their regulations and the specific exemptions to them so as to present an 
obstacle to loophole arguments and promote consistent interpretation of the 
regulations). 
 187. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (detailing the mass 
inconsistencies and dearth of applicable law for courts and legislators to follow in 
evaluating discriminatory practices for fairness, and discussing the lack of federal 
legislation to direct the states in their efforts moving forward). 
 188. See generally McNeal, supra note 155 (laying out a framework of 
considerations for legislators as they attempt to create regulations for the use of 
commercial drones in government surveillance and imaging practices). 
 189. See id. at 28 (concluding that the best regulatory approach to issues 
involving commercial drones is to avoid disrupting the “status quo” while 
combining rules targeted at the surveillance practices, data retention, and 
transparency by the user to create a “complete legislative package”). 
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Having solidified the regulatory proposal’s modus operandi, 
the discussion now turns to identifying the risks it must account 
for if it is to succeed. Framed within a concern for potential 
increases in unfairly discriminatory insurance practices, this Note 
identifies many of the risks associated with the integration of risk 
assessment and claims adjustment drones.190 These risks include; 
(1) a reduction in the presence of human agents on site,191 (2) the 
danger that insurance underwriting formulas will depend on data 
that drones gather, analyze, and share without adequate 
regulatory safeguards,192 and (3) the burden on courts and 
legislators to evaluate the fairness of any resulting discrimination, 
including disparate impact and redlining.193 Without regulatory 
attention, these new risks will drastically alter the insurance 
landscape, and the task of evaluating their consequences will only 
grow more problematic.194 
2. Proposed Countermeasures 
a. Minimum Visitation Requirement for Human Agents 
A reduction in on-site human interaction during risk 
assessment and claims adjustment would be problematic for the 
                                                                                                     
 190. See generally supra Part IV (exploring specific consequences of 
commercial drone use in risk assessment and claims adjustment and their 
potential to increase unfairly discriminatory insurance practices). 
 191. See supra notes 120–125 and accompanying text (highlighting the 
importance of personal interaction between agents and policyholders in 
conducting a “reasonable” investigation during risk assessment and claims 
adjustment, and examining the consequences of reducing or eliminating this 
presence). 
 192. See supra notes 136–140 and accompanying text (outlining the dangers 
of abuse in data gathering, analysis, and sharing through commercial drones in 
risk assessment and claims adjustment, and exploring how those dangers might 
affect the underwriting process as it relies on such data). 
 193. See generally supra Part II (providing an overview of current 
jurisprudence on discriminatory insurance practices, examining the deficiencies 
in current subjective patterns of analysis courts use in evaluating these practices, 
and hypothesizing the difficulties that commercial drone integration into the 
insurance industry will impose on these evaluations). 
 194. See supra notes 29–42 and accompanying text (comparing examples of 
court processes for evaluating discriminatory practices and discussing the 
subjective nature of those analyses). 
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industry.195 It is well established that the risk assessment process 
balances interests in efficiency and fairness.196 At what point, 
however, are we willing to watch the former devour the latter 
entirely? With the advent of drones that are capable of completely 
replacing human agents,197 our regulatory framework must ensure 
a minimum level of interpersonal interaction in insurance 
operations. If it fails to do so, the result could be the burial of 
fairness in risk assessment altogether.198  
The goal of any regulatory scheme regarding risk assessment 
and claims adjustment begins with a desire to avoid unfair 
discrimination.199 Imposing a minimum human visitation 
requirement to risk assessment and claims adjustment sites 
ensures due process and a reasonable investigation into any claim 
or risk assessment.200 More importantly, it allows policyholders to 
remain an active part of the process.201 Requiring signatures, 
                                                                                                     
 195. See supra notes 119–124 and accompanying text (examining the negative 
effects of a reduction in interpersonal contact between policyholders and 
insurance agents and claims adjusters during those processes). 
 196. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 5 (“Laws limiting risk classification in 
insurance implicate a tradeoff between ‘efficiency’ and ‘fairness’ concerns.”). 
 197. See Hilary Rowen, The Flying Insurance Adjuster—Implications of 
Insurers’ Use of Drones, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 14, 2015), 
http://www.bna.com/flying-insurance-adjusterimplications-n17179926526/ (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Rather than having inspections done by a person peering 
up from the ground, on a ladder or walking through a field, the inspections will 
be done by a person looking at photos taken by a drone or reviewing a computer 
analysis of data collected through drone-mounted sensors.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 198. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 21 (“First, fairness and efficiency 
concerns often, though not always, cut in opposite directions. Trading off 
efficiency and fairness concerns is what lawmakers are asked to do every day, but 
predicting the outcome of such balancing is no easy task.”). 
 199. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing the core 
principles behind standard rating and risk assessment policies, which include 
avoiding inadequate or unfairly discriminatory results). 
 200. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text (explaining that 
insurance agents must conduct “reasonable investigations” during claims 
adjustment to avoid bad faith accusations). 
 201. In his recommendations to legislators, Gregory McNeal discusses the 
value of including the public in the loop of aerial surveillance and drone 
operations. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 20–21 (chronicling the timeline of 
helicopter and drone operations in the United Kingdom, and quoting several 
officials who interpreted the public’s extremely positive response to increased 
transparency and communication). 
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statements from policyholders during on-site interviews, or the 
completion of situational investigation “checklists” by insurance 
agents would be straightforward methods of ensuring 
compliance.202 If a regulatory scheme does not safeguard some 
form of personal contact, it is only a matter of time before insureds 
are excluded from the process altogether.203 
b. Restrictions on Access, Retention, and Transfer of Drone-
Gathered Data  
Ensuring responsible, fair, and secure data practices is the 
other primary goal of this regulatory scaffold.204 The allure of risk 
assessment drones lies not only in their ability to reach dangerous 
and inaccessible areas, but also in their technological versatility.205 
These drones are equipped to capture, store, and even transmit 
high volumes of data and imagery with incredible efficiency.206 For 
a system of regulation on these drones to have any teeth, the entire 
                                                                                                     
 202. Insurers consider many of these processes “tedious,” and investigations 
and inspections often lack promptness and attention to detail, which these 
requirements could remedy. See Chip Merlin, Contents Claim Adjusting Is 
Tedious, Time Consuming and Few Insurance Carriers Do It Right, PROP. INS. 
COVERAGE L. BLOG (June 21, 2013), http://www.property 
insurancecoveragelaw.com/2013/06/articles/insurance/contents-claim-adjusting-
is-tedious-time-consuming-and-few-insurance-carriers-do-it-right/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing how a majority of insurers often lack promptness and 
attention to detail during claims adjustments on contents and real property 
damage and implying that there are certain bad faith incentives motivated by the 
prospect of saving money) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 203. There is already a trend of alienating the policyholder during claims 
adjustment, which could reach the point of no return if drones are introduced into 
the process. See id. (discussing the current trend of claims adjusters allowing 
policyholders to “self-assess” their property during a claim, providing no feedback, 
and then not informing them when they have missed a potential award). 
 204. See generally supra Part IV (exploring the potential risks to policyholders 
through unregulated collection, use, and transfer of data via drones during risk 
assessment and claims adjustment). 
 205. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (espousing several 
pro-drone arguments that laud the diversity of a typical commercial drone’s 
payload, their maneuverability, and the versatility of on-board cameras and 
mapping lasers). 
 206. See generally supra Part III (offering a primer on the technological 
capabilities of insurance drones and their roles operations in risk assessment and 
claims adjustment). 
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process must be hemmed within a desire to prevent these 
capabilities from aiding unfair discrimination. 
One way to achieve this would be to institute time-based 
restrictions on how long insurers can access drone-gathered data 
or keep it on file.207 Gregory McNeal’s proposal for the use of drones 
in government and police operations applies this suggestion in a 
parallel context.208 Making drone-gathered information more 
difficult to access as time passes prevents discriminatory redlining 
based on historical trends or outdated information.209 If these 
restrictions are codified, there will be little room for individual 
modification by insurers.210 This ensures consistency and 
predictability in enforcement and would provide reviewing entities 
with applicable standards of conduct for data access in unfair 
discrimination claims.211 Regulations on data retention also 
decrease the likelihood of information on an insured and their 
property being improperly shared with third parties without their 
consent.212 Additional regulations might focus on the methods of 
collection, processing, and storage of the data, such as software, 
operator access, flight patterns, and data transmission.213 Courts 
                                                                                                     
 207. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 18 (discussing the public’s concern over 
potentially unlimited access to data gathered by drones that is placed in long-term 
storage, particularly within the context of government or police operations, and 
recommending time-based restrictions on that access). 
 208. See id. (“To protect against pervasive surveillance and warehousing of 
data about citizens, legislators should enact retention policies and procedures 
that make it more difficult for the government to access information as time 
passes.”). 
 209. See id. at 18–19 (proposing various time-based restrictions on data access 
that would prevent the police or government from using intimate details or 
irrelevant historical data to draw conclusions in surveillance and analysis). 
 210. See id. at 18 (“While the specific duration of time and processes may be 
subject to debate, all procedures and timelines should be legislatively determined 
and therefore cannot be modified by individual agencies.”). 
 211. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of 
consistency among state jurisdictions in standards of review for unfair 
discrimination claims). 
 212. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 18–19 (explaining how restrictions on the 
retention of data from drone operations, as well as automatic deletion procedures 
and protection from certain information release mandates, will necessarily keep 
private and sensitive information from falling into the hands of a party without 
consent of the individual). 
 213. See id. at 18 (“Legislators should adopt policies that address collection 
and retention of information in a way that focuses on the information that is 
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and legislators could then decide whether these considerations 
were adhered to in a particular discrimination claim and evaluate 
fairness using concrete policy, as opposed to vague statutory 
language.214  
c. Regulatory Devices Promoting Transparent Accountability  
By far, the most difficult piece of this puzzle is regulating the 
application of drone-collected data to insurers’ underwriting 
formulas in order to prevent unfairly discriminatory redlining215 
and disparate impact.216 While insurers often set their own 
assessment formulas within general parameters of the relevant 
state regulations,217 a competent regulatory scheme must hold 
them accountable to policyholders. It is tempting to propose a 
blanket exclusion of certain types of data or usage, such as images 
and videos of the relevant property.218 While this would be 
reassuring to policyholders, a balanced framework must allow 
insurers to retain some autonomy.219 Therefore, a better 
suggestion may be to require transparency and accountability 
                                                                                                     
collected, how it is stored, and how it is accessed, rather than the particular 
technology used to collect the information.”). 
 214. See supra Part II (considering multiple examples of courts relying on 
vague or inadequate statutory language in evaluating the fairness of a particular 
practice, often resulting in very different interpretations). 
 215. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (defining redlining as a 
situation where “the insurer charges higher rates or declines to write insurance 
for people who live in particular areas”); supra notes 130–133 and accompanying 
text (discussing modern examples of redlining and treatment of the practice by 
different jurisdictions). 
 216. See supra notes 45–49 (outlining the development and current 
applications of the Disparate Impact Rule). 
 217. See GARY M. COHEN, NEW APPLEMAN ON INS. LAW LIB. ED. § 8.02(1)(a) 
(2013) (stating that each state in the United States and Washington, D.C., are 
tasked with “regulating the business of insurance,” and describing various state 
regulatory structures addressing the insurance industry). 
 218. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 27–29 (stating that legislators “should be 
careful to not craft hasty legislation based on emotionally charged rhetoric,” and 
projecting the negative ramifications of overly broad, sweeping regulations on 
commercial drone use in an aerial surveillance context of any kind). 
 219. See id. at 28 (recommending that legislators enact regulations that 
balance legitimate aerial surveillance and drone uses within an industry against 
interests of the private individual subject to that surveillance). 
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measures on the part of insurers, such as regular publication 
regarding their usage of commercial drones and the data they 
gather.220 McNeal suggests a similar requirement when discussing 
the use of drones in police operations, focusing on the publication 
of “usage logs.”221 In the insurance context, policyholders 
concerned over the extent of drone operations in their risk 
assessment or the evaluation of a claim could simply examine 
those publications.222  
Alternatively, insurers could prepare logs and give them only 
to the policyholder in cases where sensitive or personal 
information is involved.223 As McNeal suggests, it might even be 
possible for insurers to outfit their drones with software that 
records these logs automatically, and allows their export to 
authorized parties.224 This retains privacy for the individual and 
the agency, but still creates a record that reviewing courts could 
look to if an unfairly discriminatory result arose.225 Accountability 
and transparency regulations might also counteract the potential 
for disparate impact discrimination; failures to heed policy could 
prove the causation element required for a successful claim.226 
                                                                                                     
 220. See id. at 19 (“To hold law enforcement accountable, legislators should 
mandate that the use of all aerial surveillance devices (manned or unmanned) be 
published on a regular basis (perhaps quarterly) on the website of the agency 
operating the system.”).  
 221. See id. (“These usage logs should detail who operated the system, when 
it was operated, where it was operated (including GPS coordinates), and what the 
law enforcement purpose for the operation was.”). 
 222. See id. at 21 (“Just as a police helicopter high overhead can be ominous 
to those on the ground who are unaware of its purposes, the very idea of drones—
of any kind—flying above American cities and towns might be foreboding to many 
lay persons.”). 
 223. See id. at 20 (discussing alternative publishing strategies where 
sensitive or personal information is involved in the log). 
 224. See id. at 19–20 (“Legislators may even mandate that unmanned systems 
operated in their jurisdictions come equipped with software that allows for the 
easy export of flight logs that contain this information.”). 
 225. McNeal discusses this benefit in an analogous context of United Kingdom 
police departments who publish their usage logs from helicopter and drone 
operations. See id. at 20 (describing police efforts in Islington and other British 
cities to publish helicopter usage logs to the public through Twitter and social 
media platforms, which has resulted in increased accountability, decreased public 
complaints, and more transparent operational standards). 
 226. To prove causation, policyholders would argue that the use, 
manipulation, or transfer of data through drone operations proximately caused a 
discriminatory result in ratings, assessment, or claims adjustment. See Dana L. 
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Where insurers may have used technology such as satellite 
imagery to quietly redline vast portions of land,227 drone 
operations would be transparent. Their results would be open to 
examination, and insurers would be forced to prove that their 
considerations were within the bounds of reason and fairness.228 
The threat of accountability may prevent insurers from 
discriminating against regions based on geographic, economic, or 
even racial indicators drawn from drone-collected data.229 
As far as risk assessment and claims adjustment procedures 
are concerned, some level of trust between insurers and 
policyholders remains necessary.230 However, drawing back the 
veil on the use of drones in these processes ensures some level of 
accountability by insurers to policyholders in their operation of 
drones. Time-based restrictions, regulations on data retention and 
collection, and transparent accountability will serve as a solid 
foundation upon which to build that trust.231 
                                                                                                     
Kaersvang, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowner’s 
Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 2014 (2006) (examining the necessary steps to 
prove the causation element of a disparate impact claim, and various factors 
insurers consider such as crime rate, claims paid out, territorial boundaries, and 
the quality of municipal services). 
 227. See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text (detailing a 
California-based insurer’s use of satellite imagery to deny coverage to an entire 
zone of previously insured properties based on newly discovered proximity to 
flammable wild brush). 
 228. Recall that claims adjusters must conduct “reasonable” investigations to 
avoid sanctions for bad-faith practices. See supra notes 119–120 and 
accompanying text (describing the insurer’s duty to conduct a “reasonable 
investigation” before denying a claim and potential consequences of the failure to 
do so). 
 229. Again, this notion returns to the idea of transparency and accountability 
regulations creating a record for courts to refer to where a policyholder claims 
drone operations are the cause of disparate impact or other class-based 
discrimination through insurance practices. See generally Kaersvang, supra note 
226 (discussing the elements of a successful disparate impact claim, the procedure 
for proving it to a reviewing entity, and factors that insurers are more or less 
likely to consider based on vulnerability to a disparate impact claim and 
accountability for that effect). 
 230. See Kai-Uwe Schanz, Reputation and Reputational Risk Management, 
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 377, 377–78 (2006), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/ 
41952888.pdf (“Clearly, for financial services in general, and for insurers in 
particular, the trust of policyholders and other stakeholders is a necessary 
condition for conducting business.”). 
 231. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 28 (recommending that legislators pursue 
enhanced transparency measures and data protection procedures to balance the 
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C. Entities Capable of Effectuating Regulatory Countermeasures  
With this framework in mind, the final task is to examine 
which entities, if any, may be appropriate to introduce these 
countermeasures, and how they might do so. Historically, the 
insurance industry has enjoyed a rare exclusion from federal 
regulatory efforts, instead relying overwhelmingly on state law to 
regulate their conduct and policies.232 This has led to grave 
inconsistencies in standards of review and enforcement, as well 
frustration from federal and industry officials.233  
1. States as Insurance Regulators  
For over 100 years, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
power of states to exercise “superintendence and control over the 
business of insurance” through statutory exercise of their 
regulatory and police powers.234 Through state departments and 
insurance commissioners, states are generally responsible for 
licensing insurers, examining their books and records, and 
investigating claims of unfair practices.235 States also have the 
                                                                                                     
interests of private individuals against the goals of insurers). 
 232. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.02(1)(a) (“Every state, and the District of 
Columbia, has an office in the executive branch that is charged with regulating 
the business of insurance. In some states, this office is a stand-alone Department 
of Insurance, while in others it is part of an agency with broader regulatory 
authority.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 233. See Gary M. Cohen, Framework for the Regulation of the Insurance 
Industry—New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition, Chapter 8, NEW 
APPLEMAN BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legal 
newsroom/insurance/b/applemaninsurance/archive/2010/04/19/framework-for-
the-regulation-of-the-insurance-industry.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Many 
in the industry, as well as the Treasury Department in its recent White Paper on 
regulatory reform, have criticized state regulation as inconsistent and outmoded, 
claiming that its lack of uniformity imposes an undue regulatory burden on 
market participants.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 234. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 412, 414–15 (1914) 
(evaluating the legitimacy of state involvement in fire insurance ratings, 
discussing the historical trend of state involvement in “the business of insurance” 
dating back at least to 1837 in Massachusetts, and recognizing that it falls within 
the scope of the regulatory and police powers of the state). 
 235. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.02(2)(c) (outlining the standard 
administrative framework of state insurance departments, the role and powers of 
the insurance commissioner, licensing requirements, and investigation 
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authority to regulate rates to an extent, and may consider the 
“Model Laws” of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) for guidance, or adopt them.236 Although 
state rating policies vary widely, their ultimate purpose remains 
as a lone bastion of consistency: “to ensure that rates not be 
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.”237 Beyond this, 
however, states are divided in their approaches to rating 
regulation; most employ either a “prior approval”238 or a “file and 
use”239 approach. The “flex rating” approach represents a hybrid of 
these two systems, and is used in a few jurisdictions.240 
Consequently, state departments and insurance commissioners 
have the power to promulgate regulations that implement 
insurance statutes enacted by the relevant legislature.241 All this 
is to say that regulation in the insurance industry has historically 
run through the states. This characteristic has led to inconsistency 
and frustration, and the regulatory solution this Note proposes 
latches on to this growing unrest, championing greater federal 
involvement and more cohesion between regimes.242 
                                                                                                     
procedures). 
 236. See id. § 8.02(2)(g) (“State insurance commissioners also have 
well-established authority to regulate insurance rates. Nearly every state has 
some form of rate regulation, but the particulars vary state-by-state and by the 
line of insurance. NAIC model laws reflect this diversity.”). 
 237. Id.  
 238. See id. (“Under the ‘prior approval’ approach, insurers file proposed rates 
with the state’s insurance department and must wait a specified period of time 
before the rates become effective. During this period, the state may request 
revisions to the rates, support for the rates or may even disapprove the rates.”). 
 239. See id. (“Some states use a ‘file and use’ approach, which permits the 
insurer to use the filed rate unless, and until, the insurance department takes 
steps to disapprove the rate within a specified time.”). 
 240. See id. (“The ‘flex rating’ approach is a hybrid of the ‘prior approval’ and 
‘file and use’ approaches. This permits insurers to file and then use their rates, 
provided their rates are within a specified range.”). 
 241. See id. § 8.02(3) (“Insurance departments have the authority to 
promulgate regulations implementing insurance statutes enacted by the 
legislature. The department’s rulemaking authority is generally subject to 
procedural limitations, including a requirement to provide notice to interested 
parties and the public and an opportunity to submit comments on the proposed 
regulations.”) (footnote omitted). 
 242. See id. § 8.07(9)(a) (“Frustration with the costs, delays, and inconsistent 
regulation that is believed to be inherent in state-based regulation led to calls for 
Congressional legislation that would establish a regime of federal regulation 
which would preempt state laws and regulations governing the business of 
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2. Potential Federal Regulators  
“There has been increasing involvement by the federal 
government in the insurance industry, sometimes with the support 
of all or portions of the industry and sometimes despite its 
opposition.”243 After the financial collapse of 2008, the proposal of 
several bills culminated in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (the Act).244 Among other reforms, 
the Act created the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) to study “the 
current state-based system of insurance regulation and the costs 
and benefits of the potential federal regulation of insurance.”245 
The FIO has the authority to monitor “all aspects of the insurance 
industry” and “the extent to which traditionally underserved 
communities and consumers, minorities and low-and 
moderate-income persons have access to affordable insurance 
products regarding all lines of insurance, except health 
insurance.”246 After releasing a study on how to modernize and 
improve the system of insurance regulation in the United States 
(albeit well past its initial deadline),247 the FIO has since taken on 
the role of an active market observer. The scope of its influence, 
however, clearly encompasses the integration of commercial 
drones into risk assessment and claims adjustment.248  
The NAIC is another entity that is heavily involved with 
insurance regulation at the federal level.249 Its stated mission is to 
                                                                                                     
insurance.”). 
 243. Id. § 8.07(1). 
 244. 111 P.L. 203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 245. COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.702(1). 
 246. Id. § 8.702(10). This authority is limited in a few excepted categories, 
including health insurance and crop insurance, which are regulated by other 
entities. See id. (“The authority of the Office extends to all insurance lines except 
health insurance, long-term care insurance, with specified exceptions, and crop 
insurance.”); see also 31 U.S.C. § 313(d)(1)–(3) (defining the scope of the FIO’s 
regulatory power and specifically listing health and crop insurance as exceptions). 
 247. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.07(10)(c) (discussing the goals, 
consideration factors, deadlines, and subsequent impacts of the three FIO reports, 
including the report on modernization and improvement). 
 248. See supra note 246 (discussing the scope of the FIO’s authority under 
31 U.S.C. § 313(d) and its limited exceptions).  
 249. See Cohen, supra note 233 (commenting on the NAIC’s role in insurance 
regulation and their recent push for uniformity between federal and state 
regulatory regimes). 
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“assist state insurance regulators, individually and collectively, in 
serving the public interest and achieving the following 
fundamental insurance regulatory goals in a responsive, efficient 
and cost effective manner, consistent with the wishes of its 
members.”250 The NAIC is organized into six standing committees 
that address various areas of the insurance industry.251 The 
primary method of influence for these committees is to create and 
approve “Model Laws” and “Model Regulations” addressing 
various topics within the industry.252 These are non-binding unless 
a state specifically adopts them, but are promulgated to promote 
uniformity and influence policy.253 “The use of model acts and 
regulations to promote uniformity has led to decidedly mixed 
results; there are some model laws which have been adopted by all 
of the states, while others have been adopted by relatively few.”254 
3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Suggested Regulators 
Fostering the cooperation and consistency between federal 
and state regulators is the key to effective implementation of any 
drone-centric regulatory framework.255 An obvious suggestion is to 
task the NAIC with promulgating Model Regulations that address 
the use of drones in risk assessment and claims adjustment in 
particular.256 Clear, consistent Model Regulations requiring 
minimum site visitation, responsible data practices, 
accountability, and transparency could provide much desired 
                                                                                                     
 250. COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.05(2). 
 251. See id. §8.05(4) (describing each of the six standing committees of the 
NAIC, including the subjects of insurance that each committee covers). 
 252. See id. § 8.05(5) (“The primary way that the NAIC promotes uniformity 
and influences policy is through the creation and approval of its Model Acts and 
Model Regulations.”). 
 253. See id. (“These laws have no effect unless adopted by the legislatures of 
the respective states.”). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 5 (exploring the background of the FAA 
and other federal agencies’ involvement in the integration of commercial drones 
into the national airspace, and discussing the need to create recommendations 
that synthesize state and local regulatory efforts with federal actions). 
 256. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.05(5) (“The primary way that the NAIC 
promotes uniformity and influences policy is through the creation and approval 
of its Model Acts and Model Regulations.”). 
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consistency and predictability for reviewers of drone-influenced 
insurance practices.257 The main issue with this approach is that, 
like other model codes, the NAIC’s Model Laws are not binding on 
states unless they expressly adopt them.258 Therefore, while Model 
Regulations on insurance drones could provide consistent, 
persuasive authority for reviewing entities in cases of unfair 
discrimination, a lack of state participation may doom this option 
to relative ineffectiveness.259 
Alternatively, the FIO could prove useful in propelling a 
regulatory framework forward at the federal level.260 One way to 
involve them would be to propose an “optional charter” system.261 
First proposed by Congress in 2002 concerning life and property 
insurance underwriting, this method would create an “opt-in” 
regulatory system for insurers at the federal level.262 The Charter 
would grant general regulatory authority to the FIO or another 
federal agency and impose minimum standards on the states, 
which would retain the responsibility of regulating ratings.263 This 
homogenous federal regime could foster consistency across 
jurisdictions by creating a baseline of standards from which to 
                                                                                                     
 257. See supra notes 190–254 and accompanying text (exploring minimum 
visitation requirements, data retention and time-based restrictions on access, and 
transparency and accountability measures, and connecting them as solutions to 
help courts evaluate potentially unfair discrimination in insurance practices). 
 258. See supra note 253 (discussing the non-binding character of NAIC Model 
Laws and Regulations). 
 259. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.05(5)(a) (explaining that efforts by the 
NAIC to encourage uniformity in matters related to consumer protection and 
other restrictive rating laws are often polarizing, and thus not attractive to most 
states). 
 260. See id. § 8.07(1) (describing the genesis of the FIO through the 
promulgation of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010). 
 261. See id. § 8.07(9)(b) (“[An optional federal charter] would permit national 
insurance companies to choose whether to be regulated by the federal government 
or by the states, much as banks can, under some circumstances, choose whether 
to be state-regulated thrifts or federally chartered savings and loans.”). 
 262. See id. (“[The Charter] would have created an Office of National Insurers, 
a new federal agency under the Treasury Department, and established an 
optional federal charter for national insurers to underwrite both life and 
property/casualty insurance.”). 
 263. See id. (“The federal regulator would have had general regulatory 
authority over solvency and policy forms, but rate regulation would have been left 
to the states. The states would still have licensed producers, subject to minimum 
federal standards.”). 
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draw during evaluations of discriminatory insurance practices 
resulting from drone-based operations.264 If legislators could 
gather enough support, they could even replace the “optional” 
nature of the charter with codified mandatory minimums that 
would apply to all states.265 It is possible that the “opt-in” 
characteristic could relegate the FIO to a similar “persuasive” 
position as discussed in the NAIC example.266 At a minimum, 
however, either option creates a persuasive regulatory platform 
addressing the risks of unfairly discriminatory insurance practices 
resulting from insurers’ use of drones.267 This still accomplishes 
the goal of providing states with intelligible guidance, and 
promotes uniformity among the jurisdictions.  
It is unlikely that states will ever be completely stripped of the 
responsibility to regulate ratings and combat unfair 
discrimination.268 Instead, progress is more likely to be found in 
sponsoring a cohesive regulatory approach between the federal and 
state levels.269 A system of federal minimums addressing specific 
concerns like interpersonal contact, data security, transparency, 
and accountability could achieve this and counteract the 
                                                                                                     
 264. See id. (explaining that the role of the optional charter was to provide 
state regulatory bodies with common policy considerations when generating their 
own rating regulations). 
 265. This would probably take more convincing, as Congress has failed thus 
far to pass even the original optional structure, due to state tensions over 
perceived pressure on states to comply. See ETTI BARANOFF ET AL., 1 ENTERPRISE 
AND INDIVIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT 326 (2012) (discussing the evolution of 
legislation that “added fuel to the debate of state versus federal insurance 
regulation” and why the optional federal charter and certain other provisions did 
not make the final versions of various laws). 
 266. See supra notes 258–259 and accompanying text (delineating the 
inherent problem of an NAIC-based regulatory solution stemming from the fact 
that NAIC Model Regulations are not binding on states unless those states 
expressly adopt them). 
 267. See generally supra Part II (discussing the current inconsistency and 
lack of coherent authority for courts to follow in unfair discrimination 
evaluations, and the need for better sources of guidance). 
 268. See BARANOFF, supra note 265, at 332 (“The state insurance 
commissioners have extensive power in approving policy forms and controlling 
the rates for insurance.”). 
 269. See id. at 326–27 (discussing the ongoing debate between federal and 
state regulation of insurance, the relatively small size of state regulatory offices, 
inadequacies in administration that can result from those deficiencies, and 
arguments that increased federal involvement would alleviate this). 
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discriminatory potential of drone operations.270 Whether in the 
form of NAIC Model Regulations or an FIO Charter271—whether 
optional, persuasive, binding, or instructive—a framework that 
addresses these concerns at the federal level will positively 
influence state policies. The resulting structure will be more 
consistent, predictable, and reliable for everyone involved: 
insurers, policyholders, and reviewing courts and agencies.272  
In summation, the current regulatory landscape of the 
insurance industry is inadequate to address the risks of unfairly 
discriminatory insurance practices advanced by commercial drone 
integration.273 The best method for implementing an adequate 
solution is to increase involvement at the federal level to promote 
synergy among the states.274 Specifically, such a framework should 
require minimum visitation by human agents during risk 
assessment and claims adjustment.275 In addition, it should 
                                                                                                     
 270. See generally supra notes 190–255 and accompanying text (offering these 
countermeasures as a proposed regulatory framework to combat a potential rise 
in unfairly discriminatory practice as a result of commercial drone operations by 
insurers). 
 271. See supra notes 252–254 and accompanying text (describing the NAIC’s 
role in insurance regulation and their process of issuing Model Regulations to 
encourage uniformity among jurisdictions); supra notes 261–264 (hypothesizing 
the construction of an “optional charter” regime under the FIO, and its benefits 
as persuasive, or perhaps binding, authority). 
 272. Compare this conclusion to the one McNeal draws from his regulatory 
proposal to legislators addressing government and police drone use. See McNeal, 
supra note 155, at 28 (concluding that a regulatory approach that focuses on 
cooperation between federal and state jurisdictions, limits “pervasive 
surveillance” through restrictions on access to and retention of data, and 
encourages transparency and accountability by the operator, is the best approach 
to the integration of drones). 
 273. See Maj. Stephen Maddox & Capt. David Stuckenberg, Drones in the U.S. 
National Airspace System: A Safety and Security Assessment, HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L 
SECURITY J. (Feb. 24, 2015, 10:53 AM), http://harvardnsj.org/2015/02/drones-in-
the-u-s-national-airspace-system-a-safety-and-security-assessment/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016) (“Presently, drone integration is problematic due to regulatory 
impediments on their operations and the resultant political climate.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 274. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.07(10)(c) (discussing the mission of the 
FIO and the Dodd-Frank Act, both of which place an emphasis on an increased 
federal role in insurance regulation as a response to growing unrest with the lack 
of uniformity in regulation and enforcement between states). 
 275. See supra notes 200–203 (proposing minimum human visitation 
requirements for claims adjustment, and exploring the potential implementation 
strategies and benefits of them as a countermeasure to discriminatory practices 
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address the collection, use, storage, and transmission of data, 
perhaps through time-based and retention restrictions.276 Finally, 
that framework must hold insurers accountable for their drone 
usage by mandating transparency, possibly through required 
publications and disclosures of their operations.277 This solution 
could be implemented in multiple ways, including NAIC Model 
Regulations278 or an optional charter underneath the FIO.279 At 
minimum, either of these options will produce persuasive 
authority for reviewing courts and policymakers concerned with 
the nexus between insurance drone integration and unfairly 
discriminatory practices.280  
VI. Conclusion  
The integration of drones into risk assessment and claims 
adjustment operations presents a formidable challenge to 
individuals who seek to prevent insurers from using drones to 
discriminate unfairly. The addition of commercial drones to the 
toolset of insurance underwriters is akin to introducing the first 
automobile into a small town with horse drawn carriages. What do 
you do with it? What are the rules? It is easy to propose that initial 
drone operations and products need to “fit in” the existing 
                                                                                                     
arising from the use of drones by insurers). 
 276. See supra notes 204–213 (discussing the benefits of potential regulations 
addressing time, retention, and transfer of data gathered by drones during risk 
assessment and claims adjustment proceedings). 
 277. See supra notes 214–229 (outlining several arguments in favor of 
imposing transparency and accountability related regulations on insurers and 
comparing that proposal to one made in the context of government and police uses 
of drones for aerial surveillance). 
 278. See generally COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.05 (describing the organization, 
mission, and activities of the NAIC, including their promulgation of Model Laws 
and Regulations for the purpose of promoting uniformity among state 
jurisdictions in insurance regulation). 
 279. See id. § 8.07(10) (laying out the creation of the FIO through the 
Dodd-Frank Act, its mission, and optional charter provisions that were proposed 
with its original legislation); BARANOFF, supra note 265, at 326 (describing the 
optional federal charter proposal for insurance regulation, and weighing its 
attractiveness in the overall debate between federal and state regulation). 
 280. See generally supra Part V (discussing repeatedly the operation of the 
NAIC and FIO, the potential persuasive and binding authority that they may 
promulgate, and their role in the framework proposed by this Note).  
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framework of established regulations in the industry. The 
problem—as this Note has explained—is that efforts to establish 
this foundation are moving at a dangerously slow pace. In fact, 
entrusting the government at any level to efficiently create a set of 
rules to operate within may be downright Pollyannaish. 
Regardless, a very real threat exists of growth in discriminatory 
practices within the insurance industry, as the powerful 
capabilities of drone systems continue to reveal themselves.  
It is necessary, therefore to address this inevitable industrial 
revolution with a responsible, cohesive, and organized approach. 
With an understanding of the current landscape of insurance 
regulation and commercial drone integration, it is possible to 
identify the risks these drones pose to policyholders. Chief among 
these is the concern that unregulated drone use in risk assessment 
and claims adjustment will lead to a rise in unfairly discriminatory 
insurance practices. A regulatory framework that fosters 
coordination between federal and state governments can combat 
these risks. This cooperative effort will provide consistency and 
reliable authority for reviewing courts and policymakers to lean on 
when evaluating claims of unfair discrimination. 
Hearken back to our friend Ethel Baxter. If nobody is willing 
to identify these potential abuses and propose a workable solution, 
to whom will she turn? As a society, are we prepared to let Ethel 
and others be shut out from the risk assessment and claims 
processes completely? Have we decided that digital imaging, 
laser-mapping, inflexible algorithms, and robotic 
recommendations should replace a real human being? Will we 
allow entire communities to be exposed to unchecked 
informational sorties by fleets of pre-programmed insurance 
agents? These questions leave us on the brink, a regulatory tipping 
point between the balances of efficiency and fairness. We stare now 
into the maw of a great wave that will take us in one of two 
directions: forward, to a society where even machines treat 
policyholders fairly, or somewhere darker, where the true goals of 
the process remain uncertain. 
